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This workbook is designed to help the gathering 
multitude, as they converge on São Paulo, further 
understand the stakes involved in NETmundial.  For 
many, these stakes include the future of the internet—a 
relatively recent phenomenon that has fundamentally 
changed the structure of speech, altered the power 
of states, disrupted long-standing institutions, and 
provided new opportunities for creativity, commerce, 
education, and innovation.
The internet is young, ubiquitous, full of further 
promise, and a proven agent of social change.  It is a 
miracle of both governance and non-governance.  The 
challenge is to determine, against all odds, whether 
this apparent miracle can be sustained—whether the 
miracle, if it exists, can be more broadly extended and 
the	internet’s	benefits	more	widely	distributed.		But	the	
internet is not only a miracle; it is a riddle, a riddle of 
contested jurisdiction, both universal and sovereign. As 
far as governance issues are considered, the principles 
that could be said to be “universal” in terms of guiding 
the internet’s growth, and how these principles should 
be	 determined,	 are	 among	 the	 difficult	 issues	 facing	
participants at the NETmundial conference.  
One of the goals of NETmundial is to demonstrate 
that multistakeholder discussions can end in concrete 
achievable goals or steps— showing that summits do 
not just lead to fora and fora to regional conclaves. 
In part, NETmundial is the product of impatience, 
impatience with digital division, impatience with the 
continuation of what were once thought to be provision-
al arrangements, and impatience and anger at existing 
practices of surveillance and vast compromises of 
privacy. But there will also be those who consider the 
virtues of inertia where it is not clear what the conse-
quences of particular changes might be. 
The way in which NETmundial works to help establish 
universal principles and a roadmap for governance is 
ambitious both in substance and in process.  It occurs 
at a historical junction—one where the very geopolitics 
of internet governance are at issue; and the geopolitics 
of the internet overlap with major changes, if it can 
quaintly be put this way, outside the internet. Questions 
of hegemony and control mix with philosophies of par-
ticipation.  NETmundial is, therefore, a complex effort 
to	 redefine	 and	 redesign	what	 constitutes	 legitimacy,	
favoring one set of efforts or recommendations as “law” 
or “universal.”  
What provides legitimacy to one group of universal 
principles rather than another? On the one hand, it is 
the intrinsic merit of the principles. Do they capture 
and	 refine	 an	 otherwise	 tangled	 set	 of	 conflicting	
interests?		Has	the	final	document	produced	a	service-
able consensus while recognizing that not every issue 
can suitably be addressed?  And while there may be 
a rough consensus of those around the table, what of 
those who do not agree? Consensus is made easier 
when dissonant and dissident voices are at bay. This is 
always a danger, but its magnitude will be seen through 
a rear view mirror.
In this sense, part of the challenge is negotiating 
between concrete clarity and the comforting envelope 
of vagueness and generality. Broad cushions can 
smother	difference.		Here	too	finding	the	right	balance	
is tricky. For example, how should the commitment to 
human rights be articulated? Of course, considerations 
of privacy should prevail, but naming the circumstances 
that	define	privacy	and	when	it	can	be	waived	will	be	
sometimes required.
Legitimacy arises from the substance of what is 
presented, but it also arises from process. Legitimacy 
within a state can be achieved through parliamentary 
action or the ukase of a leader. But legitimacy in an 
international	domain	is	far	more	difficult	to	define.		Le-
gitimacy often comes from treaty  or decisions between 
leaders.  Here is where NETmundial becomes so 
interesting and important. Because NETmundial is 
part of a long and painful effort to rethink models of in-
volvement and because the value of that effort is being 
challenged, how process emerges from São Paulo is of 
great	significance.
So many deliberate and careful efforts have been 
undertaken in the run-up to this meeting: the struggle 
to pass and make into law the Marco Civil—a turning 
Introduction
By Monroe Price
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point for lawmaking in Brazil and a robust potential 
model for other countries to follow; innovative steps at 
ICANN; the establishment of a calculated organizing 
committee with the desire to represent multistakehold-
erism in a new way. All of this and more constitutes 
steps to bolster the event’s legitimacy.
In this workbook, we have tried to provide some back-
ground to NETmundial, including the history of the 
meeting and the Marco Civil process in Brazil; some 
background on the environment in Germany—with 
particular attention to the link between the meeting and 
the Snowden case; questions of legitimacy surround-
ing open processes for lawmaking; and comments on 
the material presented to the organizing committee by 
official	and	unofficial	commenters.
This workbook is a project of the Internet Policy Obser-
vatory at the Annenberg School for Communication at 
the University of Pennsylvania. A steering committee 
included Ellery Roberts Biddle of Global Voices, 
Ronaldo Lemos of the Rio Institute for Technology and 
Society, and Monroe Price of Annenberg. They were 
assisted by Laura Schwartz Henderson, Briar Smith, 
and Alexandra Esenler.  Funding for the Observatory 
and this project comes from the Annenberg School and 
a grant from the United States Department of State.
Monroe Price is director of the University of Penn-
sylvania’s Center for Global Communication Studies 
(CGCS) at the Annenberg School for Communication, 
where he works with a wide transnational network 
of regulators, scholars, and practitioners in Europe, 
Africa, Latin America, and Asia, as well as in the 
United States. Price also founded the Programme in 
Comparative Media Law and Policy at Oxford Uni-
versity and remains a research fellow there. He also 
chairs the Center for Media and Communications 
Studies at Central European University. 
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In 2014, the World Wide Web celebrates its 25th 
birthday. So far, it has proven a momentous year for 
the web. On March 14, the United States Government 
announced that it would transition the IANA contract to 
ICANN by a deadline of September 2015. On March 
25, the Brazilian House of Representatives passed 
the “Marco Civil da Internet,” a piece of legislation that 
Sir Tim Berners-Lee hailed as an example of how to 
answer his call for creating a “Magna Carta” for the 
internet.	Brazil	is	the	first	country	in	the	world	to	heed	
that call: The Marco Civil effectively creates a bill of 
rights	for	the	Brazilian	internet,	a	first	for	the	world.
Brazil’s announcement of hosting the NETmun-
dial meeting could not be timelier. This short essay 
describes the NETmundial meeting, provides some 
context for the event, and speculates on what it could 
achieve.
The Forces Behind NETmundial
As the other essays in this compilation demonstrate, 
there are several internet governance processes 
currently in place. I do not aim to describe them here 
– researchers Deborah Brown, Joana Varon, and Lea 
Kaspar have created a visualization1 of the existing 
global internet governance ecosystem that provides a 
good glimpse into their complexity.
Amidst ongoing processes led by UNESCO, the ITU, 
and other non-UN entities, Brazil has stepped into the 
picture. The timing could not be better.  The origins of 
NETmundial are closely connected with the Snowden 
revelations. As Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff 
was personally affected by the NSA espionage, the 
case stirred a great deal of political furor, and the 
Brazilian government moved quickly to respond. This 
resulted in her cancellation of a state visit to the US 
and her now famous speech before the UN. During 
the Rousseff´s remarks at the opening of the 68th UN 
1 http://www.gp-digital.org/publication/Internet-governance- 
processes-visualising-the-playing-field/	
General Assembly in September 2013, 2 she stated 
that the espionage “affects the international community 
itself and demands a response from it.” She also 
announced that Brazil would develop proposals for the 
establishment of a “civilian multilateral framework for 
the governance and use of the internet.” 
In October, Rousseff met with ICANN CEO Fadi 
Chehadé in Brasilia, Brazil’s capital. Shortly thereafter, 
the two announced that Brazil would host an “interna-
tional summit of government, industry, civil society and 
academia” in April 2014. The term “summit” was later 
replaced by “conference,” avoiding the connotation that 
it would be exclusively a governmental meeting.
The organizational efforts for NETmundial followed 
suit, with further arrangements and negotiations taking 
place during the Internet Governance Forum in Bali 
(October 2013), and at the ICANN meeting in Buenos 
Aires (November 2013). A clear sign that Brazil was 
increasing its participation in internet governance 
processes was the attendance of high-level govern-
mental	 officials	 at	 these	meetings,	 including	Minister	
of Communications Paulo Bernardo, members of the 
Brazilian Telecommunications Agency, and the Ministry 
of Foreign Relations.
In November, the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee 
(CGI.br) released further details indicating that the 
conference would be organized by CGI.br in partner-
ship with 1Net, an “open platform” that emerged out of 
the efforts to draft the “Montevideo Statement on the 
Future of Internet Cooperation,”3 released on October 
7, 2013 after a meeting of several multistakeholder 
technical standards organizations (IETF, W3C, ICANN 
and	 others).	 CGI.br	 also	 identified	 the	 two	 principal	
objectives of the conference: 
2 Dilma Rousseff, “Remarks by Dilma Rousseff at the UN 68th 
General Assembly,” Voltaire Network, September 24, 2013, 
http://www.voltairenet.org/article180382.html.
3 “Montevideo Statement on the Future of Internet Cooperation,” 
ICANN, October 7, 2013, https://www.icann.org/en/news/
 announcements/announcement-07oct13-en.htm.
Enter Brazil: NETmundial and the Effort to 
Rethink Internet Governance
By Ronaldo Lemos
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(a) the elaboration of a set of international principles of 
  internet governance;
(b) to propose a roadmap for future developments of  
 the internet governance ecosystem.
Unlike other processes, NETmundial does not intend to 
be a recurring, ongoing effort. In principle, it is intended 
to take place only once – it is something of an experi-
ment.	Even	if	one	cannot	find	it	in	the	official	documents,	
another goal of the conference is to demonstrate in 
practice a set of “multistakeholder” examples, and 
to articulate how they could be implemented in other 
internet governance fora going forward.
A good example of this experimental approach is 
the co-organization of NETmundial in partnership 
with 1Net. This has led to some degree of criticism, 
including debates about the organization’s legitimacy 
to effectively represent the full diversity of “civil society.” 
In support of 1Net, academics such as Milton Mueller 
have claimed that the organization “is not a movement, 
but a platform for coordinating the diverse groups in 
a single place.” Without delving deeper into the con-
troversy, such debates demonstrate the challenges 
of building a balanced and legitimate process that 
accounts for the issue of agency and representation, 
an issue that largely remains unresolved in multistake-
holder processes. 
As Brazilian internet pioneer and CGI.br member 
Carlos Afonso put it: “The Brazilian government or the 
group organizing NETmundial will not, of course, be 
able to reach everyone on a proactive basis. But they 
are very open, very open, to receive all the sugges-
tions, all the proposals.”4
What is NETmundial Trying to 
Achieve?
As mentioned above, the two objectives of NETmundial 
are the elaboration of a set of international principles of 
internet governance, and the proposition of a roadmap 
for future developments of the internet governance 
ecosystem. 
4 Audio recording from ICANN meeting, November 2013, http://
audio.icann.org/meetings/buenosaires2013/chehade-
 ig-20nov13-en.mp3.
Regarding the elaboration of a set of international 
principles, Brazil has been involved in an effort similar 
to this at the national level for quite some time. In 
2009, the CGI.br approved an important document 
called “Principles for the Governance and Use of the 
Internet.”5 This document created a list of 10 principles, 
including “freedom, privacy and human rights,” “demo-
cratic and collaborative governance,” and “neutrality of 
the network.” 
It is no coincidence that President Rousseff articulated 
similar principles in her remarks at the UN General 
Assembly, namely:
1.  Freedom of expression, privacy of the individual  
and respect for human rights. 
2.  Open, multilateral and democratic governance,       
carried out with transparency by stimulating 
collective creativity and the participation of society, 
Governments and the private sector. 
3.  Universality that ensures the social and human 
development and the construction of inclusive and 
non-discriminatory societies. 
4.  Cultural diversity, without the imposition of beliefs, 
customs and values. 
5.  Neutrality of the network, guided only by technical 
and ethical criteria, rendering it inadmissible to 
restrict it for political, commercial, religious or any 
other purposes.” 6
Moreover, the Brazilian House of Representatives 
passed the Marco Civil in March 2014. If the bill is 
also passed by the Senate, it will be a clear effort to 
turn those principles into law. Brazil’s experience can 
serve as an inspiration – and a policymaking roadmap 
– for other countries, beginning with the NETmundial 
meeting.
It is likely that Brazil will try to project the local experi-
ence to the international level. One important aspect in 
that sense is that Article 24 of the Marco Civil sets forth 
that internet governance in Brazil must be “governed 
by multistakeholder mechanisms that are transparent, 
collaborative and democratic, with the participation 
5 “Principles for the Governance and Use of the Internet,” 
Brazilian Internet Steering Committee, 2009, http://www.cgi.br/
regulamentacao/pdf/resolucao-2009-003-pt-en-es.pdf. Available 
in English, Portuguese, Spanish.
6 Dilma Rousseff, “Remarks by Dilma Rousseff at the UN 68th 
General Assembly,” Voltaire Network, September 24, 2013, 
http://www.voltairenet.org/article180382.html.
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of the government, the business sector, civil society, 
and the academic community.” This is precisely the 
governance structure of the CGI.br (Brazilian Internet 
Steering Committee) itself, which is governed by the 
same directives, and the organizer of NETmundial. 
With NETmundial, one of the goals of the Brazil meeting 
is to demonstrate that an open approach regarding 
participation is not only desirable but necessary for 
internet governance processes. The country adopted 
this approach in drafting the Marco Civil itself, which 
was built collaboratively by means of an open online 
and	offline	process.	It	also	sets	the	example	for	internet	
governance at the local level, by means of the gov-
ernance model actually adopted by the CGI.br. This 
expanded multistakeholder approach is also desired 
and supported by a number of civil society organiza-
tions.7
From an international perspective, the NETmundial 
efforts constrain the Brazilian position regarding the 
transition of the IANA functions. As the likely origin of 
the	world’s	 first	 comprehensive	 “bill	 of	 rights”	 for	 the	
internet, and as the host of this meeting, Brazil has 
distanced itself from the possibility of having the IANA 
functions undertaken by the International Telecommu-
nication Union, an idea that the country has entertained 
in the recent past. Brazil is now committed to supporting 
a transition that points in the direction of an organiza-
tion that operates within the “global multistakeholder 
community.” It is worth mentioning that this was the 
expression used by the US Commerce Department 
to announce its intent to transition the internet domain 
name (IANA) functions.8 With NETmundial, Brazil takes 
a step in the direction of the US, even if the objective 
is to later propose a “third way.” This impression was 
reinforced by Secretary John Kerry’s tweet about the 
conference that states, “Thanks to Gvt of #Brazil for 
inviting U.S. to co-host #NETmundial in Sao Paolo. 
Everyone has a stake in #Internetgovernance.”9
7 “Civil society representatives welcome NTIA announcement on 
transition of key internet domain name functions,” Best Bits Net-
work, March 16, 2014, http://bestbits.net/ntia-announcement/.
8 “NTIA Announces Intent to Transition Key Internet Domain 
Name Functions,” National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration, US Department of Commerce, March 14, 2014, 
  http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-
 intent-transition-key-Internet-domain-name-functions.
9	 Tweet	from	verified	account	of	John	Kerry.	Unique	link:	
 https://twitter.com/JohnKerry/status/431467951116398592
The State of Play Right Before the 
Conference
The open call for proposals launched by NETmundial 
received 188 contributions from 46 different countries. 
The countries with the largest number of contributions 
are the United States (31 contributions), Brazil (16), 
United Kingdom (7) and India (7). 
The breakdown of the different sectors contributing is 
as follows: 31% civil society, 23% business, 15% gov-
ernment, 11% academic community, and 8% technical 
community.10 It is important to note that some criticism 
has emerged regarding the small number of contribu-
tions/participation on the part of governments and the 
technical community.
From the practical perspective, there are concerns 
about how much of the meeting will be devoted to the 
discussion of internet principles, seen as a long-term 
goal, and how much of it will be devoted to the tran-
sition of the IANA functions, a short-term goal. Such 
concerns arise regarding the possibility that the discus-
sion about principles might cast a shadow over the 
more urgent discussion about the role of ICANN.
In this regard, the Internet Governance Project 
launched a proposal led by scholars Milton Mueller and 
Brenden	Kuerbis	that	focused	specifically	on	the	transi-
tion of IANA. The goal of the proposal is “to resolve 
the 15-year controversy over the United States govern-
ment’s special relationship to the Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).” The 
already controversial11 proposal “involves removing 
root zone management functions from ICANN and 
creating an independent and neutral private sector 
consortium to take them over.”12 It states that it “will be 
… formally submitted to NETmundial.” This promises to 
be one of the most important practical debates during 
the NETmundial event. 
10 “Submissions to NETmundial,” Knowledge Commons, http:// 
www.knowledgecommons.in/brasil/en/internet-governance-
meeting-in-brasil-23-24/submissions-to-netmundial/.
11 Monika Ermert, “Privatize, Don’t Internationalise, Internet 
Oversight, Academics Say,” Intellectual Property Watch, March 
4, 2014, http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/03/04/privatize-dont-
internationalise-Internet-oversight-academics-say/.
12 Brenden Kuerbis, “A Roadmap for Globalizing IANA,” Internet 
Governance Project, March 3, 2014, http://www.Internetgover-
nance.org/2014/03/03/a-roadmap-for-globalizing-iana/.
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In summary, NETmundial is a promising event, but its 
success will be measured by how much of its discus-
sions and goals will be undertaken by other fora. Ideally, 
the efforts of NETmundial should become part of the 
next IGF meetings. But for that to be effective, the IGF 
itself must evolve. It needs, for instance, the ability to 
set recommendations going forward. The evolution of 
IGF may be a critical topic for discussion at NETmun-
dial, as part of its goal is to set the “roadmap for future 
developments of the internet governance ecosystem.” 
Ronaldo Lemos is the director of the Rio Institute for 
Technology & Society, and professor at the Rio de 
Janeiro State University’s Law School. He is member 
of the Mozilla Foundation Board, and the Access Now 
Board, among others. He was one of the architects for 
the “Marco Civil da Internet”, a law establishing a bill 
of rights for the internet in Brazil.  Ronaldo earned his 
LL.B. and LL.D. from the University of São Paulo, and 
his LL.M. from Harvard Law School. He is currently a 
non-resident visiting scholar with the MIT Media Lab.
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NETmundial, to be hosted by the Brazilian govern-
ment in late April, will be an opportunity to address 
some basic questions and concerns governments 
and users alike have been asking, in various ways, for 
over a decade. While it may not be possible to provide 
answers to all open questions and concerns, the Brazil 
debate will nevertheless be a signal to the world that 
the	multistakeholder	community	 is	seeking	 to	 fulfil	 its	
commitment towards gaining a better  understanding of 
all the different dimensions of internet governance. This 
will be important as without a clear signal in this regard, 
the pressure to move to more traditional, top-down inter-
governmental arrangements will increase. Ultimately, 
those who seek a different outcome have to answer 
the question of how to move to a new consensus. 
NETmundial can be the beginning of gaining a better 
understanding of what a new international consensus 
might look like. 
I. Internet Governance at a 
Crossroads
The internet was built on basic libertarian and demo-
cratic axioms; it was developed and deployed outside 
the	sphere	of	government	influence,	with	the	academic	
and technical communities playing the leading role. 
Their distributed, informal, and bottom-up decision-
making process challenges the traditional world of 
governments, which is based on the principle of 
national sovereignty, as enshrined in the UN Charter. 
Since the 1648 Peace Treaties of Westphalia, national 
sovereignty has been the cornerstone of how govern-
ments envision and conduct global governance and 
participate in international affairs. Developing countries 
in particular have a young national identity and attach 
great importance to the fundamental principle of 
national sovereignty. Some of these countries wish to 
“extend national sovereignty into cyber-space,” which 
to many developing countries makes more sense than 
the abstract notion of multistakeholder governance. 
In many ways it is a debate between the traditional 
concept of national sovereignty and the cyberlibertar-
ian vision of the world that is best embodied in David D. 
Clark’s famous words “We reject: kings, presidents and 
voting. We believe in: rough consensus and running 
code”13 and in John Perry Barlow’s “Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace.”14 These two visions 
have dominated the debate on internet governance 
since its inception more than ten years ago. 
2014 will be a pivotal year as the future of the internet 
and internet governance is at a crossroads. The open 
question is whether there will be an international 
consensus on the multistakeholder internet governance 
model or a shift towards a more intergovernmental 
model. The internet as a network of networks has 
enabled the creation of collaborative human networks 
based on trust. This trust was shared by internet 
users.15 Last year’s disclosures of pervasive govern-
ment surveillance programs were akin to a seismic shift 
in the internet governance landscape. The large-scale 
nature of these programs made internet users realize 
that the chain of trust - which is essential to the proper 
functioning of the internet - had been broken. This 
 realization created a sense of urgency to review current 
internet governance arrangements. Major conferences 
are taking place in 2014 and 2015, providing opportuni-
ties to restore trust in the internet and its governance. 
However, these conferences also pose a threat to the 
open, global, and interoperable internet, as some gov-
ernments will be tempted to impose top-down internet 
governance arrangements, which could ultimately 
endanger the internet’s openness and lead to its frag-
mentation.
13 In a presentation given at the 24th meeting of the Internet Engi-
neering Task Force (IETF).
14 John Perry Barlow, “A Declaration of the Independence of 
Cyberspace, February 8, 1996.” (1996) https://projects.eff.
org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html. 
15 The term user refers to all stakeholders – governments, private 
sector, civil society, academic and technical communities and 
individual users belonging to all these categories.
The Ever Evolving Landscape of Internet 
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II. The History of the Debate 
The debate on how best to deal with internet gover-
nance has a long history. The internet is now a global 
resource and a key factor contributing to today’s global-
ized world. It is therefore not a surprise that more and 
more governments, businesses, and people, including 
ordinary users, take an interest in issues related to 
the internet. The internet is no longer exclusively a 
medium	for	academic	and	scientific	communities,	and	
today it has huge social and economic impacts for most 
countries. The internet has become so important that 
governments consider it to to be part of their critical 
infrastructure and want both to know how it is being run 
and to have a say in its governance. 
Discussions about how to administer the commercial 
internet started in the 1990s, but these talks were 
confined	 to	 a	 circle	 of	 insiders.	 Without	 delving	 too	
deep into the history, it is worthwhile to recall that the 
Clinton Administration decided that a traditional inter-
governmental	set-up	would	be	sufficient	for	the	rapidly	
evolving technology. This was one of the elements that 
led to the establishment of the Internet Corporation 
of Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) in 1998. 
Since then, the US Government has retained different 
levels of oversight over some core internet governance 
functions. Meanwhile in 1998 in Ottawa, Canada, the 
Ministers of the Organisation of Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) met and came to the 
conclusion that there was no need for any regulation 
on	e-commerce,	 as	 regulation	might	 stifle	 the	 further	
evolution of the underlying internet technology. In the 
same year, the 2nd Ministerial Meeting of the World 
Trade Organization, held in Geneva, Switzerland, 
came to a similar conclusion and decided to impose a 
moratorium on any e-commerce regulation.
While ICANN was being formed and governments were 
agreeing to take a hands-off approach to the internet, in 
1998 the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 
held its Plenipotentiary Conference in Minneapolis 
and agreed to hold a World Summit on the Informa-
tion Society (WSIS). This proposal was very much in 
line with traditional UN summits on major issues that 
face the global community. The underlying motivation 
of these traditional UN summits is to provide a forum 
for governments to come together in search of global 
solutions for major challenges. In short, the objective 
for WSIS was to apply the traditional governance 
model to information and communication technologies 
(ICTs), driven by the internet.
This push for a more regulated internet came to the 
fore	during	the	preparatory	phase	of	the	first	phase	of	
WSIS, held in Geneva in 2003, when the term ‘internet 
governance’	first	emerged.	WSIS	in	2003	adopted	the	
Geneva Declaration of Principles16 and introduced the 
notion of multistakeholder governance. However, the 
words used in these principles mean different things to 
different people. For instance, to most governments the 
term “mulitlateral” refers to classical intergovernmental 
cooperation, however, non-governmental actors would 
like	 to	 redefine	multilateral	 as	multistakeholder	 coop-
eration. 
At the second phase of WSIS, held in Tunis in 2005, 
heads of state and governments recognized that 
the current distributed, bottom-up, multistakeholder 
internet governance arrangements based on voluntary 
cooperation between many different organizations were 
well suited to the underlying distributed technology. 
WSIS	 confirmed	 that	 “the	 existing	 arrangements	 for	
internet governance have worked effectively to make 
the internet the highly robust, dynamic and geographi-
cally diverse medium that it is today.”17 The working 
definition	of	 internet	governance,	as	contained	 in	 the	
Tunis Agenda, was also a major step forward towards 
the recognition of the legitimacy of multistakeholder 
processes.18 In short, one essential conclusion of WSIS 
was that multistakeholder cooperation at all levels is a 
precondition for sound and good internet governance 
and that international coordination cannot work if there 
is no coordination at national and regional levels. While 
this	was	a	 significant	 outcome	of	 the	WSIS	process,	
governments also made it clear that there was room 
for improvement. In essence, governments wanted to 
16 Geneva Declaration of Principles, (ITU, 2003), para. 48, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/official/dop.html. “The 
international management of the internet should be multilate-
ral, transparent and democratic, with the full involvement of 
governments, the private sector, civil society and international 
organizations. It should ensure an equitable distribution of re-
sources, facilitate access for all and ensure a stable and secure 
functioning of the internet, taking into account multilingualism.”
17 Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (ITU, 2005), para. 55,  
 http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html.
18	 “A	working	definition	of	internet	governance	is	the	development		
and application by governments, the private sector and civil 
society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, 
rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape 
the evolution and use of the internet.” Ibid., para. 34.
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know how the internet was being run and they wanted 
to have a say in it.  
WSIS did not mark the end of the debate; it was more a 
kind of truce. It was the beginning of what has become 
a more intense debate about the future of the internet 
and what kind of society we want. WSIS took the debate 
on how to run and manage the internet out of a circle 
of insiders and put it in the limelight of an international 
policy debate. 
The debate since Tunis has grown in importance 
because the internet has also grown. Between Geneva 
and Tunis the internet broke the mark of 1 billion users. 
Today, there are 2.5 billion users online, and many ap-
plications that were in their infancy in the early 2000s 
are now part of users’ everyday experiences. The 
greater its economic, social, and political weight, the 
more attention governments will pay to the internet. 
III. A Multidimensional Debate 
The debates during WSIS and in the IGF show that 
there are several dimensions to internet governance. 
The	 first	 dimension	 concerns	 issues	 of	 polity.	 The	
role of governments in managing the internet and 
the relationship between governments, the private 
sector, and other stakeholders are key to the debate. 
Those who defend the traditional intergovernmental 
approach would like to see governments at the top of 
the pyramid, while some governments, mainly western 
democracies, are happy to take a back seat and let 
the non-government actors take the lead. While the 
internet community advocates for an open, inclusive, 
and bottom-up approach to internet governance, it 
must be recognized that current governance arrange-
ments are very different from the basic architecture 
and traditional design of international cooperation. 
The challenge therefore is to reconcile the concept 
of national sovereignty with the internet model and its 
borderless nature. While there is no easy way to do 
this, one way forward could be an evolving concept of 
“shared sovereignty”19 over a common public good or, 
19 Sherrill Brown Wells and Samuel F. Jr Wells, “Shared 
Sovereignty in the European Union: Germany’s Economic Go-
vernance,” Yale Journal of International Affairs 3 (2008): 30–43, 
http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/083203wells.
pdf. 
as termed by WSIS, a “global facility available to the 
public.”20
Second, there is a geopolitical dimension with many 
countries, developing countries in particular, feeling 
uncomfortable about the role of the US Government, 
which, for historical reasons, has the ultimate authority 
over some of the internet’s core resources. Critics of 
the status quo assert that this authority should be 
shared with the rest of the world, as they consider the 
internet a global good. Specifically, they compare the 
situation to the world of telecommunications, which 
is regulated by the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU) where all countries have an equal say 
through a “one-country, one-vote system.” In their view, 
the same model should apply to the internet. On the 
other hand, non-governmental stakeholders from all 
parts of the world make it clear that they feel left out of 
classical intergovernmental arrangements and prefer 
that the internet run in a bottom-up collaborative way. 
Third, there is a strong developmental dimension to this 
debate. This has two components: a digital divide issue 
as well as a participation issue. Developing countries 
want cheap internet access. Broadband access at a 
subscription rate of 50 USD/month  may seem like a 
reasonable cost for users in developed economies, but 
this can be an unsurmountable burden in a country 
where an average salary may hardly exceed 200 
USD.  Developing countries, with their limited human 
and financial resources, also find great difficulty in 
making their voice heard in distributed governance ar-
rangements and feel marginalized.21  They feel more 
at home in the traditional intergovernmental approach 
of UN processes. What is more, due to the complex 
fragmented nature of the various internet governance 
mechanisms, developing countries find it difficult to 
determine what is going on, which institution is dealing 
with what aspect of governance, and what possibilities 
they have to contribute meaningful input to ongoing 
processes. Despite this, developing countries would 
like to have a seat at the table and take part in dis-
cussions on the internet, as they see the internet as 
a powerful tool to help them reach objectives for their 
economic and social development.
20 Ibid.
21 Don MacLean et al., Louder Voices: Strengthening Developing 
Country Participation in International ICT Decision-Making, 
Report (Panos Institute, February 26, 2009), http://panos.org.uk/
wp-content/files/2011/03/louder_voicesGjJeXx.pdf.		
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Fourth, there is an economic dimension, which, by and 
large, is also part of the developmental dimension. As 
in the off-line world, economic dynamics are dominated 
by multinational players in the Global North. Develop-
ing countries find this unfair, and again compare the 
situation with the telecommunications sector and would 
like to change charging arrangements and adapt them 
to the telecom model, i.e. share the cost of international 
leased lines and move to a “settlement” of internet 
traffic. This view is also shared by some incumbent 
telecom operators in developed economies, however, 
it is rejected by major internet players who see such 
a model as an antithesis to the architecture of the 
internet. These players point out that a large amount 
of the connectivity costs are locally generated and 
that the right regulatory environment, with liberalized 
markets and increased competition, will bring down 
prices. In addition, there is a link to the linguistic and 
cultural aspects. Internet charges are also linked to 
local content as users prefer local content when local 
content exists. In connection with Internet Exchange 
Points (IXPs), the access to local content will also 
reduce international charges. In general, it is felt that 
that the most appropriate level to address issues of 
access is the national level and that the main locus 
for policy development and implementation is at the 
national level.
Fifth, there is the technological dimension. The internet 
is a new technology based on packet-switching. It 
took time for regulators familiar with telecommunica-
tions to adapt to this new technology. These regulators 
are used to solutions aimed at a different technology, 
circuit-switching, and they may be tempted to rely on 
solutions that are not adapted to the internet’s technol-
ogy.
Finally there is a sixth social and cultural dimension. 
Human rights in general and freedom of expression in 
particular rank high in this debate. Western media see 
the debate on internet governance as an opportunity 
for	 authoritarian	 governments	 to	 attempt	 to	 stifle	 the	
medium and to gain control over its content. This is 
seen as an attack on the very essence of the internet 
which from its beginning has been an extraordinary 
medium of empowerment, providing new levels of 
access to information and knowledge, irrespective of 
borders and unprecedented in history. Culture and 
linguistics are also prominent parts of this debate that 
strongly link to developmental and political dimen-
sions. The internet developed as a medium based on 
the English language and as a vehicle for the English 
language. Many non-native English speakers resented, 
and still resent, this and take it as another sign of the 
cultural dominance of the English language. They want 
to make use of their own language on the internet. 
Major European languages also based on Latin script 
had the means to quickly develop their own content 
and digitalize their written heritage, making it acces-
sible through the internet. But even these languages 
took some time in developing domain names that are 
compatible with their own spelling. For languages not 
based on Latin script, the problem is more complex. 
Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Arabic are languages 
in which huge progress has been made with the in-
troduction of Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs) 
as these languages have a critical mass to generate 
their own content. However, languages that are spoken 
by fewer people face a more arduous up-hill struggle. 
Their market may be too small for developing commer-
cially viable software that allows the transcription of the 
language for computer use. This mix of one language’s 
dominance, a perceived better deal for some languages 
(primarily from rich and developed countries), linked to 
the absence of their own language from the internet , 
can lead to a feeling of marginalization, if not alienation 
for developing non-English countries. 
IV. Growing Discontent
The inconclusive debate that dominated WSIS has 
been simmering in the background since 2005 and 
continued in the broader UN context. ‘Enhanced coop-
eration’ became one of the buzzwords that remained 
unresolved. Discussions about ‘enhanced cooperation’ 
– one of the “WSIS leftovers” – remind us that some 
governments see limitations in existing multistake-
holder processes.  Simultaneously, the internet found 
its way into the discussions of the General Assembly’s 
First Committee that deals with disarmament, global 
challenges, and threats to peace. 
During the World Conference on International Telecom-
munications (WCIT) in 2012, the debate rekindled and 
made news headlines. WCIT, in many ways, brought the 
economic dimension of internet governance to the fore. 
However, the economic dimension of the WCIT debate 
overlooked that the best argument in favor of the multi-
stakeholder internet model was the internet’s ability to 
foster creativity, innovation, empowerment, economic 
growth, and job creation. There is economic evidence 
that underpins this argument. The Organisation for 
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Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
has already unequivocally recognized the internet’s 
economic weight, as have various consultancies.22 The 
OECD Internet Economy Outlook 201223 highlights the 
spread of the internet throughout the economy and 
expects that the internet will continue to expand while 
businesses,	individuals,	and	governments	will	find	new	
innovative ways to leverage its potential. Governments 
also need to be made aware of the underlying phi-
losophy of standards development, based on the Open 
Standard Paradigm,24 by the leading standard develop-
ing organizations. The approach of “innovation without 
permission” has fostered the internet’s development.
At the same time, WCIT was also very much a wakeup 
call that revealed many unanswered questions and 
concerns that developing countries had with respect 
to the internet. There is no doubt that developing 
countries face a multi-faceted problem, and that there 
is no simple solution to solve it. It is an issue that is 
part of the “digital divide” nexus. However, developing 
countries may also need assistance to start setting up 
their	 IXPs	 and	 regional	 backbones,	 and	 developing	
their local content. WCIT was a very complex negotia-
tion, and it would be oversimplifying to divide the world 
in two camps, those who signed the treaty and those 
who did not, as there were some strong supporters for 
the internet model amongst countries that signed the 
treaty. 
The geopolitical dimension of the internet governance 
debate was an undercurrent at WCIT. This undercur-
rent was swept to the surface by the disclosures of the 
pervasive government surveillance programs in June 
2013. Although the surveillance programs had nothing 
to do with the authority over the IANA functions, critics 
of	the	role	of	the	United	States	conflated	the	two	issues	
and used these revelations to renew their calls for 
further globalization of internet governance arrange-
ments. As called for in the Montevideo statement,25 
issued by the leaders of the organizations responsible 
for the internet’s technical infrastructure, the key to the 
22  McKinsey, Boston Consulting
23  OECD Internet Economy Outlook 2012 (OECD 
 Publishing, 2012), http://www.keepeek.com/oecd/media/
science-and-technology/oecd-internet-economy-outlook-2012_
9789264086463-en#page1.
24  “Principles,” Open Stand, n.d., http://open-stand.org/principles/.
25 “Montevideo Statement on the Future of Internet Cooperation,” 
Internet Society, October 2013), http://www.internetsociety.org/
news/montevideo-statement-future-internet-cooperation.
further globalization of internet governance arrange-
ments is a globalization of the IANA functions.
V. The IGF as a Defense Line of 
Multistakeholderism
The main pillar of the complex internet governance 
debate after WSIS is the Internet Governance Forum 
(IGF). In Tunis, heads of state and governments felt 
there was a need to continue the dialogue on internet 
governance in a new setting. They gave a mandate 
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to 
convene a new multistakeholder forum for public policy 
dialogue– the IGF. The IGF mandate is very broad and 
allows for discussing almost any policy subject related 
to internet governance. It is also clear, insofar as it 
states, that the IGF is not a decision-making body. 
The IGF and all the national and regional IGF initiatives 
are the foremost multistakeholder venue that familiar-
izes governments with the internet model. It is also 
the only place that touches on all the dimensions of 
internet governance.
The IGF was meant to provide a platform for a dialogue 
between governments and the internet community.26  It 
was in many ways the beginning of a dialogue between 
these two different cultures: on the one hand the private 
sector and the internet community’s informal processes 
and culture of “rough consensus,” and on the other 
hand the more formal, structured world of governments 
and intergovernmental organizations. In this respect it 
was a learning process in which both cultures took their 
first	steps	towards	working	with	each	other.
Quite unlike traditional United Nations processes, the 
IGF serves to bring people together from various stake-
holder groups as equals, but not to make decisions or 
negotiate. Rather, they discuss, exchange information, 
and share best practices with each other. While the IGF 
may not have decision-making abilities, it informs and 
inspires those who do. The forum facilitates a common 
understanding of how to maximize internet opportuni-
ties,	use	them	for	the	benefit	of	all	nations	and	peoples,	
and address risks and challenges that arise.    
26	 UN	Secretary-General	Kofi	Annan	in	his	address	at	the	inaugu-
ral IGF meeting.
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From	its	first	meeting	in	Athens	in	2006	to	its	most	recent	
one in Bali in 2013, the IGF has continuously evolved, 
and the quality of the dialogue has progressively 
matured. The IGF has created a sense of community 
that allows challenging issues to be discussed in an 
open and frank manner. Part of the value of the multi-
stakeholder approach is both agreeing and disagreeing 
on various issues and encouraging participants to 
show respect and listen to each other’s arguments, 
positions, and needs. 
The lack of decision-making power should not be seen 
as a weakness, but rather as the strength of the IGF. 
Nobody needs to be afraid of the IGF.  It will not be 
able to make “the wrong decision.” It has no power of 
redistribution. For example, it will not be able to decide 
that	 from	now	on	 institution	X	should	no	 longer	be	 in	
charge of function B, which should be taken care of 
by institution Y, and so on. However, the IGF has the 
power of recognition. It can identify issues that need 
to be dealt with by the international community, and 
it can shape the decisions that will be taken in other 
fora. The governance model of the IGF is built on ‘soft 
governance’ and ‘soft power.’27  The IGF uses a ‘soft 
governance’ approach to the internet by shaping and 
informing the decision-making processes of other insti-
tutions and governments, and preparing the ground for 
negotiations that will take place in other fora and not 
at the IGF meetings themselves. It can identify issues 
of concern and put them on the international policy 
agenda.  Paradoxically, the apparent weakness may 
be the comparative advantage of the IGF. In this sense, 
the IGF can serve as a laboratory, a neutral space, an 
enlightened space for debate, where all actors can 
raise issues. Nothing they say at the IGF can be held 
against them. 
It should also be noted that some see the IGF as a 
model for other international policy areas.28 In a 
broader context, the IGF model of bringing all stake-
holders together to discuss, on an equal footing, issues 
of mutual concern can be of interest to other fora. The 
progressive empowerment of non-governmental actors 
points to the conclusion that world politics are much 
more than the sum of relations between governments. 
27  Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World 
Politics (PublicAffairs, 2004).
28 John Mathiason, Internet Governance: The New Frontier of 
Global Institutions (Routledge, 2008), 149.
Globalization, fuelled by the rapid development of ICTs 
with the near instantaneous diffusion of information, 
makes politics a more complex trans-national process. 
VI. Strengthening the IGF
The NETmundial conference comes at a critical 
juncture. Its focus on principles and the roadmap for the 
evolution of internet governance should allow for con-
structive and forward-looking proposals to materialize 
and	reaffirm	the	basic	principles	of	the	multistakeholder	
model. It will feed into other processes such as the UN 
process of ‘enhanced cooperation’29 or the ITU’s Pleni-
potentiary Conference. However, these processes are 
intergovernmental in nature and lack the input and 
expertise of all the other stakeholders.
This leaves IGF 2014 in September well placed to 
consider the outputs from NETmundial and all the other 
processes, and to discuss how best to move forward to 
rebuild	online	 trust.	The	 IGF	has	matured	sufficiently	
to take an additional step towards producing more 
tangible takeaways and the time has come to enable 
the IGF to assume enhanced responsibilities. 
The IGF was not created to provide solutions, but to 
provide a space for dialogue, to identify problems, and 
explore possible solutions. In this respect, the IGF has 
exceeded expectations, it has proved to be a space for 
discussions that could not have taken place anywhere 
else. For those who attended the 2006 IGF meeting 
in Athens, the discussions held in Bali would have 
been unimaginable. Discussions then were tense, 
unstructured, and there was much mistrust between 
stakeholders. The IGF is still evolving and coming into 
its own, and the shape it will eventually settle into lies 
in the hands of its stakeholders.  
The Bali meeting once again proved the IGF’s worth as 
a “go to place” where the community gathers to share 
experiences and exchange information. In many ways, 
it	was	a	defining	moment.	It	 lived	up	to	the	challenge	
created by government surveillance and focused 
on the need to rebuild the trust of internet users. By 
tackling surveillance head-on, the proverbial elephant 
29 Markus Kummer, “Internet Governance: What Is Enhanced 
Cooperation?,” Internet Society Blog, July 2, 2012, http://www.
internetsociety.org/blog/2012/07/internet-governance-what-e-
nhanced-cooperation.
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in the room, and by allowing for an open and frank 
discussion of government surveillance and monitor-
ing,	it	proved	its	value.	The	IGF	facilitated	this	difficult	
debate and proved that it had matured and lived up to 
the expectations of participants who wanted to voice 
their concerns. The underlying theme in Bali was the 
necessity to rebuild internet users’ trust in the Internet, 
its	 function,	 and	how	 it	 fits	 into	 society.	There	was	a	
general agreement that the IGF was the privileged 
place to pursue these discussions and that the multi-
stakeholder format was the only way forward.
Discussions about internet principles have been high on 
the IGF agenda since 2010. At the 2010 IGF meeting in 
Vilnius, Brazilian internet principles were proposed as 
a possible model for adoption. While these principles 
found broad support, the IGF was not ready to take the 
next step. Similar discussions also took place at sub-
sequent IGF meetings in Nairobi and Baku. In Bali, the 
IGF was ready to take the discussion forward towards 
points of convergence.
The IGF has matured and it is now ready take it a step 
further, towards more tangible outputs or outcomes, as 
was suggested by the Working Group on IGF Improve-
ment, convened by the Commission on Science and 
Technology for Development (CSTD).30
Given the current challenges and given the necessity 
to	 restore	 trust	 and	 confidence	 in	 the	 internet,	 it	 is	
essential to involve all stakeholders, from developed 
as well as developing countries, in discussions on the 
future evolution of the internet. The IGF is best placed 
to take the discussions forward as it provides protec-
tion, legitimacy, and credibility to the multistakeholder 
model, since it is the only truly open and inclusive mul-
tistakeholder platform under the UN umbrella. The IGF 
protects the multistakeholder model by acting as a dam 
that prevents the discussion from moving into a more 
traditional intergovernmental setting. It has the legiti-
macy through its link to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations as its convenor and, last but not least, 
it has the credibility derived from its open and inclusive 
multistakeholder approach that allows for the input of 
expert opinions on all issues under discussion. 
30 See recommendations by the CSTD Working Group on 
Improvements to the IGF, March 16, 2012, http://unctad.org/
meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/a67d65_en.pdf. 
The IGF so far has very limited resources. For the IGF 
to respond to current challenges and to strengthen the 
IGF to enable it to play a more prominent role in the 
internet governance landscape, it is necessary to put 
it	 on	a	more	 stable	and	sustainable	 financial	 basis.31 
Reforms will be necessary and one perceived need 
is for the IGF to produce more concrete take-aways, 
whatever form they may take. The Internet Society 
suggests seeking inspiration from the Internet En-
gineering Task Force (IETF) in terms of producing 
outcome documents based on voluntary adoption and 
starting substantive intersessional work.32
The NETmundial meeting and the concerns that led 
to its creation were part of the discussions during the 
IGF in Bali. Other processes are considering similar 
questions, such as the Working Group on Enhanced 
Cooperation of the UN Commission on Science and 
Technology for Development (CSTD), the WSIS+10 
Review as well as the ITU’s World Telecommunication 
Development Conference (WTDC) and Plenipotentiary 
Conference. 
The 2014 IGF Istanbul meeting could be the starting 
point for such an evolution and take the discussion from 
NETmundial forward on the long path towards creating 
a new chain of trust for the internet. This will be a long 
process, and all stakeholders need to work together in 
this endeavor. In getting this process started, there is a 
need to focus on some concrete issues, such as ethical 
data handling, data protection, and a right to privacy, as 
essential building blocks in restoring online trust.
2014 will be a crucial year for internet governance 
going forward. The international community is called 
upon	to	reflect	what	kind	of	internet	we	want	and	how	
we want to answer the many open questions related to 
its governance. The many meetings dealing with the 
internet	will	strive	to	find	answers,	and	it	is	hoped	that	
the	community	will	be	able	to	align	itself	and	find	a	new	
international consensus on multistakeholder internet 
governance. International consensus on internet 
policies and principles is unlikely to come from only 
one source; instead it is likely to be derived from the 
31 Communication by the European Commission, http://ec.europa.
eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?doc_
id=4453.
32 Internet Society, “IGF 2014- Request for Public Input Submis-
sion by the Internet Society,” February 10, 2014, http://www.
internetsociety/sites/default/files/IGF-2014Request-for-Public-
Input.pdf.  
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voluntary adoption of compatible principles developed 
in different fora. The IGF and its national and regional 
meetings could play a preeminent role in this regard.
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I. Introduction 
The Brazilian “Marco Civil” is a remarkable project 
with regards to lawmaking in the knowledge society 
in at least two respects: First, it attempts to create a 
comprehensive legal framework for the basic infor-
mation infrastructure of the knowledge society – the 
internet. Secondly, the process of drafting the law has 
been highly participatory.33 Considering that from the 
beginning the internet has been associated with the 
promise of participation, it is interesting to observe 
that this piece of internet legislation has also become 
a test case for participation by means of internet com-
munication.34 In this regard, the Marco Civil process is 
also	significant	as	to	how	it	reconstructs	and	seeks	to	
change elements of legitimacy. Legitimacy is key to the 
acceptance of laws and regulations by those affected 
including citizens, NGOs, governments, and corpora-
tions. 
In this short essay, I aim to demonstrate the special 
nature of the current debate about multistakeholder 
ism as a new way for framing issues of legitima-
cy.  Moreover, I wish to describe another way in which 
the Marco Civil process is innovative, namely as a 
process for the production of knowledge. Lawmaking – 
and changes in lawmaking brought about by the internet 
– tend to be discussed mainly within a paradigm of em-
33 Fabro Steibel, “Designing online deliberation using web 2.0 
technologies: drafting a bill of law on internet regulation in 
Brazil,” In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on 
Theory and Practice of Electronic Governance, 38-43, ACM, 
2012. 
34 Yair Amichau-Hamburger, Katelyn Y.A. McKenna, and 
Samuel-Arzan Tal,  “E-empowerment: Empowerment by the 
Internet.” Computers in Human Behavior, 24, no 5 (2008): 
1776-1789; Stephen Coleman, and Jay g. Blumler, The Inter-
net and Democratic Citizenship: Theory, Practice and Policy, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
powerment.35 However, the aspect of changes in the 
knowledge ecology has been neglected. This article 
addresses lawmaking as a problem of knowledge and 
attempts to outline what might be considered as “good 
lawmaking” when looking through this lens. Taking that 
as a starting point, I share some observations on the 
Marco Civil process from an outsider’s perspective and 
reflect	 on	 some	 experience	 gained	 by	 policymakers	
in Germany as they have charted a path towards an 
internet-adequate regulatory framework.
II. Lawmaking in the Knowledge 
Society
1. Data, Information and Knowledge
Before we dive into lawmaking and its knowledge 
aspects we should clarify our understanding of 
knowledge. Conceptually, knowledge is closely linked 
to information and data. Gregory Bateson, who is 
associated with a semiotic approach to information, 
generally understands information as “a difference that 
makes a difference.”36 This approach has its roots in 
the idea of the single difference being the elementary 
unit of data. 
Information in a social sense must make a difference to 
a sensing being – to us as humans, who are living and 
communicating in social formations. Based on that, 
knowledge appears as information that is organized, 
accumulated, and embedded within a social context.37 
35 “European e-Participation: Summary Report,” European 
Commission, November 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/informa-
tion_society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=1499,	
p. 5,
36 Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, (New York:  
Ballantine, 1972; Northvale, New Jersey: Jaron Aronson Inc., 
2009) p. 460.
37 Helmut Willke, Systemisches Wissensmanagement, From 
Systemic Knowledge Management. 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Lucius 
& Lucius, 2001) p. 11.
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Neither information nor knowledge is a resource that 
can be put into procedures such as organizational 
management or lawmaking. It has to be constructed by 
the knowledge-processing individual or organization; 
however, the creation of context generates a design for 
the process of learning.  
2. The Knowledge Aspect of Lawmaking  
Lawmaking	is	first	and	foremost	a	political	matter.	In	a	
democracy,	the	definition	of	what	might	be	considered	
a social problem and which regulatory means should 
be applied to solve it, should be designed as a process 
of “public reasoning”.38In representative democracies it 
is, on the one hand, the main task of the parliament 
to convey democratic legitimacy. On the other hand, 
the parliament remains the main actor in the process 
of lawmaking. Notwithstanding the importance of 
 participatory instruments for citizens, multistakeholder 
forums, and other means of preparing legislation in 
representative democracies, current procedures are 
designed in such a way that the decision of the parlia-
ment constitutes the transfer of legitimacy.  
The “Governance Turn” in regulatory theory has not 
changed that. The Governance approach merely 
shows that if one analyses the normative structure in a 
given	field,	it	is	not	enough	to	construe	the	applicable	
state-set laws.39 Aspects such as private ordering or 
regulation by “code” have to be considered as well. The 
state gradually may be losing its status as the main 
organizing actor, yet that does not mean that the state 
loses its role as the primary entity that sets binding rules 
which can be seen as the self-legislation of a society.   
Coming back to the role of the parliament, in modern 
democracies the government undertakes both the 
designing of the actual law and the lawmaking. 
Meanwhile the function of the parliament is basically to 
38 Immanuel Kant, “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist 
Aufklärung? [An Answer to the Question: What is Enlighten-
ment?]” Berlinische Monatsschrift 12 (1784):pp. 481-494. An 
English translation can be retrieved from: http://www.colum-
bia.edu/acis/ets/CCREAD/etscc/kant.html
39 Gunnar Folke Schuppert, “Governance – auf der Suche 
nach Konturen eines „anerkannt uneindeutigen Begriffs 
[Governance – looking for outlines of an “admitted ambigu-
ous term”],” Schuppert/Zürn (eds.), Governance in einer sich 
wandelnden Welt. Wiesbaden 41 (2008): 13-40;  Robert O. 
Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye Jr.,  “Power and interdepen-
dence in the information age,” Foreign Affairs (1998): 81-94.
control the actions of government, even though formally 
the parliament is the main actor in lawmaking.40 
Against	this	background	we	can	formulate	a	first	set	of	
criteria for the quality of lawmaking: Are there mecha-
nisms in place that ensure that the lawmaking can in 
fact realize the will of the people? The above-mentioned 
practice, that the government is in fact drafting most of 
the laws, can already be seen as a challenge to this set 
of criteria for lawmaking. It is plausible to assume that, 
the more complex the deliberations of lawmaking are, 
the more likely it is that the government will dominate 
the parliament as far as knowledge about the actual 
structures	of	the	field	which	the	law	intends	to	impact.	
This leads to a second set of criteria against which 
the quality of laws can be measured: Good laws have 
to	 be	 functionally	 adequate,	 effective,	 efficient,	 and	
implementable.41	This	set	of	criteria	is	specifically	asso-
ciated with knowledge problems, and can be illustrated 
by examples taken from the internet sphere, though 
similar examples could easily be drawn for biotech or 
energy	 regulation	 as	 well	 as	 other	 complex	 fields	 of	
society. Examples from the internet domain include: 
Which aspects of the internet are relevant for the in-
ternet’s potential to foster innovation? Which policy 
approaches affect those factors and might, therefore, 
put the internet economy at risk? Is it technically 
possible to make the internet “forget” personal data? 
If we can assume that, at least generally speaking, 
there is an information asymmetry between the gov-
ernment and a parliament, then there is an inherent 
tension	between	the	first	set	of	quality	criteria	and	the	
second set. To put it differently: a knowledge society 
40 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Macpher-
son Ed. (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing 
Company,	1980)	http://www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-
h/7370-h.htm;  Helmuth Schultze-Fielitz, “Theorie und 
Praxis parlamentarischer Gesetzgebung – besonders des 9. 
Deutschen Bundestages (1980 – 1983) [Theory and practice 
in parliamentary lawmaking – especially of the 9th German 
Bundestag (1980 – 1983)],” (Berlin: Duncker &Humblot, 1988) 
p. 292; Denis Kibirige Kawooya, “Act of Parliament: The Role 
of Parliament in the Legislative Process: A Commonwealth 
Perspective,” European Journal of Law Reform 12 (2010): 
32-57.
41 Helmuth Schultze-Fielitz, “Wege, Umwege oder Holzwege 
zu besserer Gesetzgebung durch sachverständige Bera-
tung, Begründung, Folgeabschätzung und Wirkungskontrolle 
[Ways, Detours or wrong tracks to better lawmaking through 
authorized experts counsel, explanatory statement, impact as-
sessment and outcome control],” Juristische Zeitung (2004): 
862-871.
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must solve the problem of how complex collective 
decision making – especially, but not restricted to, 
lawmaking – can be both democratically legitimized 
and functionally adequate to regulate the internet or 
other	complex	fields	of	society.
There is, however, a third category of quality criteria 
regarding lawmaking. These revolve around aspects 
such	as	transparency	and	regulatory	fit	into	the	existing	
legal framework. These more formal aspects of good 
lawmaking are, generally speaking, not affected by the 
problem discussed here.42 However, there are interde-
pendencies. Transparency of the lawmaking process 
can enable other stakeholders to bring in their views 
as well as their knowledge and their interpretation of 
reality.  
It is plausible to assume that the parliament as an in-
stitution	faces	difficulties	in	meeting	the	second	set	of	
quality criteria outlined above. There is in fact a group 
of	 knowledge	 brokers	 ready	 to	 fill	 the	 informational	
gaps the parliament has, and those are the lobbyists. 
Lobbyism is an important factor in the knowledge 
ecology of modern democracies. However, since not all 
interests present in a society have the same resources 
to lobby their interests, there is an inherent tension 
with democratic principles when the parliament is cog-
nitively dominated by lobbyists.43
Lobbyism can be construed as the attempt to regulate 
regulation; therefore it can make use of all traditional 
regulatory resources like power, money, and knowl-
edge.44 If we can assume that the scarce and therefore 
vital resource in modern democracies is knowledge, it 
seems rational to deploy a knowledge-based strategy 
of lobbyism. In helping the politician to understand this 
complex reality, a lobbyist can try to give any issues 
the “proper” spin, e.g. as regards cause-and-effect 
patterns or leading opinions.  
42 “Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory Policy and 
Governance,” OECD, pp 4-6, http://www.oecd.org/gov/regula-
tory-policy/49990817.pdf.
43 Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts 
Congress - and a Plan to Stop It, (New York, NY: Twelve/Ha-
chette, 2011); Marc Abélès, “Rethinking NGOs: The Economy 
of Survival and Global Governance,” Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies 15 no. 1 (2008): 241-258.
44 Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, “Regulierungswissen in der Regu-
lierung,” University of Hamburg, 2012, p. 2, http://www.jura.
uni-hamburg.de/public/personen/hoffmann-riem/4.pdf.
3. Multistakeholderism and the 
Knowledge Problem  
The situation becomes even more complex if we 
consider multistakeholder  decision-making environ-
ments	such	as	the	ecosystem	we	find	in	global	internet	
governance. The scope of this article will not discuss 
the problem of multistakeholder  governance seeking 
for legitimacy.45 However, we can state that in the 
absence of formal democratic means of attaining le-
gitimacy, multistakeholder  concepts do not necessarily 
have the above-mentioned tension between conditions 
that guarantee adequate problem-solving and condi-
tions that ensure democratic legitimization. Conversely, 
organizations governed by multistakeholder  concepts 
can enhance their legitimation basis through adequate 
means of knowledge processing. Insofar as traditional 
lawmaking is one aim of the multistakeholder  process, 
the process itself can be part of the above-mentioned 
solution to the knowledge problem. Additionally, insofar 
as an organization involved in the stakeholder-process 
becomes parliament-like, it can face similar problems 
as mentioned above. 
The working document drafted by the Panel on Global 
Internet Cooperation and Governance Mechanisms 
(2014)	reflects	the	knowledge	problem	at	least	to	some	
extent. The suggested “expert communities” especially 
reflects	the	need	for	collective	learning	as	an	internet	
governance enabler. Furthermore, the “desirable prop-
erties” discussed at the panel’s 2013 London meeting 
include the “exchange of knowledge and expertise” as 
a property. However, the working document, like other 
similar	documents	in	this	context,	does	not	reflect	the	
knowledge-perspective	 as	 a	 specific	 issue.	This	may	
be due to the fact that the whole process tends to lose 
touch with the actual problem-solving and decision-
making within the governance structure, and contents 
itself with discussing the governance structure as such.
Online participation may have the potential to be at 
least part of the solution to the knowledge problem. It 
is through this lens that we now look to the Marco Civil 
process and the German experience.
45 Jeremy Malcolm, Multistakeholder  Governance and the 
Internet Governance Forum, (Terminus Press, 2008) 68-70, 
323-333; Joseph S. Nye Jr., and Robert O. Keohane, “Be-
tween Centralization and Fragmentation: The Club Model of 
Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legiti-
macy,” KSG Working Paper No. 01-004, February 2001. 
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III. Brazil – The Marco Civil 
Experience
From an outsider’s perspective, and focusing on 
the knowledge aspect of lawmaking, the Marco Civil 
appears to be remarkable in various aspects.
Regarding the content of the law, it is noteworthy that 
the regulatory approach is basically using principles to 
govern the internet. The law does not try to address 
different regulatory goals by addressing legal cases 
rather, it seeks to formulate principles. The law takes 
into	account	the	internet’s	potential	as	a	field	for	com-
munication (Art. 3 I) and innovation (Art. 4 III). This 
technique of regulation can be viewed as a way to 
deal with knowledge problems. As the internet is an 
extremely complex sociological entity, it is nearly im-
possible	to	define	the	scope	of	a	rule	in	a	fashion	that	
is not outdated with changes in technology or social 
practice.
The process of lawmaking has been remarkable as 
well. It began with collaboration between the Ministry 
of Justice and a group of professors from the Getulio 
Vargas Foundation’s Center for Technology and Society 
(CTS-FGV). Including academics in the process of 
drafting	 laws	 significantly	 changes	 the	 knowledge	
ecology compared to traditional forms of lawmaking. In 
this case, the team working on the draft law had con-
siderable experiences and remarkable relationships 
with colleagues abroad, which meant that they could 
incorporate aspects of laws from other countries, thus 
ensuring that a Brazilian law would meet international 
standards on human rights such as the freedom of ex-
pression. Most of the academics involved in the initial 
drafting of the law remained active in the lawmaking 
process that followed, which interspersed academic 
knowledge at all stages of the process.
Of course the most discussed aspect of Marco Civil’s 
lawmaking process was the decentralized and open 
consultation, followed by the debating and drafting 
of the regulatory framework. This took place in two 
stages: First in October 2009, experts focused on 
principles and aspects possibly missing in the initial 
draft of the law. This process was followed by a second 
stage where individuals, civil society organizations, 
and domestic and foreign companies commented on 
the draft law.
This kind of participatory lawmaking is often discussed 
in context of “empowerment,” neglecting the aspect 
of knowledge. In drafting internet laws of this nature, 
the lawmaker has to anticipate the effects different 
solutions for a regulatory problem can have in different 
fields	of	society,	in	this	case	especially	regarding	free	
speech or economic innovation. In fact, many of the 
contributions to the Marco Civil draft law focus on 
the potential effects that bill may have, providing the 
cognitive	basis	 for	 lawmaking.	Will	 a	 specific	 form	of	
liability be likely to create chilling effects? What means 
of circumvention are available? What are the most likely 
reactions of multi-national providers facing regulation? 
To answers these questions one needs complex, 
internet-specific	knowledge.	This	wisdom-of-the-crowd	
effect in lawmaking should be examined more closely 
in the academic discourse.
The Marco Civil process also demonstrated that the 
risk of participatory procedures being “high jacked” 
by interest groups is not a mere phantasm. Individual 
remarks on the draft from one particular IP address 
have	raised	suspicions	of	political	astroturfing.46 
IV. Experience Gained in Germany – 
Enquete Commission
Parliaments already have various instruments at their 
disposal to solve the knowledge problem. There are 
possibilities for getting insights from stakeholders as 
well as independent experts in hearings. Furthermore, 
some parliaments have internal research bureaus that 
vary greatly in manpower and resources, including the 
Congressional Research service of the US Congress, 
the Science and Technology Options Assessment of 
the	European	Parliament,	 the	Parliamentary	Office	of	
Science and Technology (POST) in Great Britain, the 
Comitato	 per	 la	 Valutazione	 delle	 Scelte	 Scientifiche	
46	 Caroline	W.	Lee,	“The	roots	of	astroturfing,”	Contexts (Winter 
2010): 73-75, http://dspace.lafayette.edu:8080/bitstream/han-
dle/10385/638/Lee-Contexts-vol9-no1-2010.pdf?sequence=1;  
Jacob Ratkiewicz, Michael Conover, Mark Meiss, Bruno Gon-
calves, Alessandro Flammini, and Filippo Menczer, “Detecting 
and Tracking Political Abuse in Social Media,” International 
AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media (2011): 
pp. 297-304, http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICWSM/IC-
WSM11/paper/viewFile/2850/3274; Kurt Thomas,  “The Role 
of the Underground Economy in Social Network Spam and 
Abuse,” University of California, Berkeley, 2013, p. 65, http://
www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2013/EECS-2013-
201.pdf. 
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e Tecnologiche (VAST) in Italy, the Research De-
partment in Estonia, the Service des Etudes et de la 
documentation of the French National Assembly, and 
the Research Services (“Wissenschaftlicher Dienst”) 
of the German Bundestag. Additionally, the staff of the 
parliament itself plays a pivotal role in the knowledge 
ecology of parliaments.
Some parliaments have additional means at their 
disposal to tackle structural knowledge problems. The 
so-called “Enquete Commission” used by parliaments 
in Germany and Austria is one such tool. The Enquete 
Commission is a special parliamentary committee com-
missioned	by	the	parliament	to	give	advice	on	specific	
issues, which are outlined in the resolution that autho-
rizes the commission’s appointment.47 The German 
Bundestag can establish such a commission under 
Article 56 of the rules of internal procedure to prepare 
decisions	on	particularly	relevant	and	extensive	fields	
of decision-making. The idea is to institutionalize a 
learning process that crosses the line between the 
territory of the parliament and other organizations. 
Enquete Commissions are composed of a number of 
members of parliament and external experts. 
Knowledge sociology teaches that diverse perspec-
tives	within	a	committee	can	produce	a	specific	brand	
of knowledge that cannot be substituted in any other 
way.48 In May 2010, the German parliament established 
an Enquete Commission on the issue of “Internet and 
Digital Society.” The commission produced sugges-
tions	in	several	volumes	of	its	final	report	that	touched	
on issues such as data protection, copyrights, media 
literacy, public sphere and culture, science, and tech-
nology.
The impact of these suggestions has so far been 
limited, however, some suggestions made it into the 
coalition treaty of the new German government in the 
fall of 2013. One suggested creating a permanent par-
liamentary committee on digital society issues, an idea 
that was put into action in February 2014. 
47 Susanne Linn, and Frank Sobolewski, “The German Bund-
estag: Functions and Procedures. Organization and working 
methods. The legislation of the Federation.” Rheinbreitbach: 
Neue Darmstädter Verlagsanstalt (2010): 42, https://www.btg-
bestellservice.de/pdf/80080000.pdf.
48 Volker Born, “Problemorientiertes Wissensmanagement in der 
Automobilindustrie [Problem oriented Knowledge Manage-
ment in the automotive industrie],”( Leipzig: Gabler Edition 
Wissenschaft, 2008), p 35.
Within the commission, the old rule was upheld: 
“Who drafts the paper wins the day.” Thus, committee 
members	with	a	back	office	could	deliver	more	 input	
than those experts who had to do draft papers single-
handedly with more limited resources at their disposal. 
The German Enquete Commission on “Internet and 
Digital Society” is worth studying because it represents 
a	specific	set	of	different	perspectives	within	the	formal	
framework of a parliamentary commission. The Com-
mission tried to make its work a kind of test case for 
participation, however, this endeavor was only partly 
successful.49 Since I have had the honor to serve on 
this committee I would like to share some observations 
from the participation process:
It was not easy to convince the administration of the 
German parliament that it was not enough for the 
commission, who was examining the potential of the 
internet, to be restricted to email communication.
 
It took some months to establish a feedback platform 
specifically	designed	for	the	Enquete	Commission.	Ad-
ditionally it was, and is still, not possible to integrate this 
platform	into	the	official	parliament		website,	which	only	
had a link to the external platform where citizens were 
invited to give input. The platform made it possible for 
citizens to suggest topics for the Enquete Commission 
and to comment and vote on suggestions others had 
made for the Commission.
In terms of actual participation not as many citizens 
as expected really made use of the possibilities the 
Enquete Commission platform offered them.50 The 
general amount of people who participated was rather 
low, however, some topics were obviously of higher 
interest than others and received more proposals and 
ideas. For example, the copyright and interoperability, 
standards, and free software group received in total 
60 sets of comments. The group on education and 
research received 36 long posts. The group on data 
49 Katharina Große, “E-participation – the Swiss army knife 
of politics?” in Conference for E-Democracy and Open 
Government, Parycek, P. and Edelmann, N. (Ed.). (Austria: 
Donau- Universität Krems, 2013) pp. 45, http://www.diva-por-
tal.org/smash/get/diva2:660884/FULLTEXT01.pdf#page=46.
50 Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, and Zarino Zappia, “Participation 
and Power: Intermediaries of Open Data,” Draft Paper in 1st 
Berlin Symposium on Internet and Society- October 26-28, 
2011, http://berlinsymposium.org/sites/berlinsymposium.org/
files/participation_and_power.pdf.
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protection and personal rights had the most contribu-
tions, 95 in total.51
Additionally, despite the low number of participants, the 
quality of input – at least in parts – was extremely high. 
Some suggestions came in the shape of elaborate legal 
text. The promise of participation was fueled by the 
fact that the parliament called the participating citizens 
the “18th expert,” putting them on the same level as 
the 17 external experts in the Enquete Commission. 
The input could have been even more meaningful 
if the knowledge aspect had been more in focus. To 
take an example, the Commission did not ask whether 
consumers already had come across violation of net 
neutrality; thus the Commission was restricted to the 
one	case	where	there	had	been	a	complaint	filed	with	
the regulator.
All the sub-committees of the committee published 
drafts of the reports, but there was a major problem 
that could not be addressed until the end of the working 
phase of the Commission – this was a problem of 
timing. To make a credible promise of participation, the 
whole procedure should have been designed so that 
the sub-committees could really integrate the feedback 
given by the members of the public. Since this was not 
the case, it was sometimes not possible to make use 
of the public’s input. The Commission has documented 
all the input and made it available for further research, 
but the impression was, at least partly, that the work of 
the public had been neglected. This appears to have 
led to some consternation among the public – one 
comment on the participation platform suggested that 
the platform was a placebo and therefore should be 
abolished.
V. Conclusions
When considering national lawmaking process, even 
in a multistakeholder environment, the parliament still 
plays a major role. If we assume that regulation in 
complex	fields,	such	as	the	internet,	becomes	increas-
ingly a knowledge problem, we should not neglect the 
procedures that organize the gathering, production and 
construction of knowledge in the process of lawmaking. 
These case studies demonstrate ways to do this. At 
51 German Bundestag, “Schlussbericht der Enquete-Kommis-
sion Internet und digitale Gesellschaft [Final Report of the 
Enquete-Commission Internet and Digital Society],” 2013, 
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/125/1712550.pdf.
first	glance,	the	Marco	Civil	process	and	the	Enquete	
Commission in Germany appear to have very little 
in common. Both procedures, however, make use 
of a structural coupling of academic expertise and 
lawmaking. In Brazil, it was the cooperation with 
academics	when	writing	the	first	draft	of	the	Marco	Civil.	
In the German case, the construction of the Commis-
sion forced external experts and MPs to work together 
and create a knowledge base for recommendations 
to the German parliament. Both instruments – mixed 
commissions as well as laws drafted by academics – 
belong to the same toolbox of instruments parliaments 
can use to gain access to academic knowledge.
Furthermore, the cases demonstrate how important it 
is to design the whole procedure in a way that enables 
participation – an attempt that was successful in Brazil 
but only partly so in Germany. However, the German 
example reveals that a small number of inputs can 
make a difference to the knowledge base for decision-
making.  
To	fill	this	toolbox	with	more	useful	instruments	and	find	
better, more dynamic ways to use them, we need to do 
the following: 
• Map the variety of instruments which parliaments 
all over the world use to address the knowledge 
problem
• Identify best practices
• Better understand the process of construction of 
knowledge and the development of interpretative 
paradigms in lawmaking
• Explore ways that the internet can help solve the 
knowledge problem 
•	 Define	 rules	 for	 lawmaking	 and	 especially	 par-
ticipation, considering the effects on the knowledge 
ecology
The development described in this essay will inevita-
bly lead to a more prominent role of academics in the 
lawmaking	process.	This	must	be	addressed	in	reflec-
tions on the role of academics and their professional 
ethics,	 giving	 academics	 a	 specific	 role	 distinguish-
able from lobbyists and civil society groups. Thus the 
knowledge ecosystem of law is in need of new rules 
and	 self-reflection.	 When	 these	 preconditions	 are	
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given, new forms of participation will have the potential 
to mediate resilient democratic legitimacy for interna-
tional  multistakeholder governance processes.
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More than half a year has passed since Edward 
Snowden	 first	 revealed	 the	 all-encompassing,	 global	
surveillance programs of the US National Security 
Agency. Since then, hardly a day goes by without jour-
nalists uncovering further details of a system in which 
Western intelligence agencies of so-called ‘democra-
cies’ go far beyond the limits of their own constitutions to 
spy on people, organizations, and businesses without 
specific	cause.	On	some	days,	new	disclosures	come	
hourly. Thanks to Snowden, we now know the answer 
to the question of whether we are being surveilled, but 
pressing questions remain: How often and by whom 
is data collected or transferred? Where is it stored? Is 
it saved forever? And most importantly, how is it used 
against us?
These questions will be central at the upcoming 
NETmundial, where tensions between the domestic 
and international policy realms will be brought to bear 
as governments and civil society advocates debate 
the broader implications of the revelations for global 
internet governance. The primary items on the agenda 
for NETmundial include developing a set of interna-
tional principles for the internet and a “roadmap” for the 
future of global internet governance.
It	is	difficult	to	conceive	of	any	“international	principle,”	
with integrity, that has not acknowledged and come to 
grips with the issue of mass surveillance.  Consensus 
on multistakeholderism, on net neutrality, and passages 
about an “open and free” internet are all built on sand 
if there is no clear understanding of the workings of 
surveillance and its consequences. 
Germany has occupied a critical position in the global 
surveillance debate since the Snowden leaks became 
public. Interestingly, there has been a sharp divide 
between the reactions of the public and the political 
elite. As Germany is a key stakeholder in NETmun-
dial, and capable of playing a central role in shaping 
policy outcomes from the meeting, it is critical to take 
this divide into account when observing the German 
government response to the surveillance issue. In this 
essay,  I want to provide some background on these 
questions—from the perspective of Germany—and 
explain how various approaches to the issues intersect 
with the NETmundial agenda.
Civil Liberties and Memories of a 
Surveillance State in Germany
There are few countries in which the Snowden disclo-
sures have caused as large a reaction as in Germany. 
Since June 2013, politicians, mass media, civil society 
organizations, and citizens have discussed its effects 
nearly daily. Issues such as data protection have 
triggered great interest and concern in Germany – 
recent history has made it easy for Germans to imagine 
that repressive structures could be reintroduced in the 
country. Given the nature of new digital communication 
infrastructure, there is wide recognition that future re-
pressive structures could be far more dangerous than 
any repressive structure of the past. The experience of 
two dictatorships over the last eighty years has likely 
generated strong public recognition of the need for civil 
liberties, and a deep understanding of the importance 
of data protection and the private sphere as a basis for 
democracy. 
If people fear that everything they communicate might 
be used against them, they will become cautious in 
what they say and think. This kind of self-censorship 
or anticipatory obedience heavily affects freedom 
of opinion and speech. If people fear retribution for 
participation in public demonstrations, the freedom of 
assembly will be affected. 
We are fortunate that German civil society has taken 
stock of these dynamics and developed a strong 
network of advocacy and resistance to state control. 
A large community of hackers, bloggers, and activists 
has successfully fought against laws such as those in-
troducing	internet	filtering,	the	ACTA	trade	agreement,	
and the EU’s data retention directive. Though it currently 
faces serious problems, the Pirate Party generated 
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hope for a political overhaul through the internet a 
few years before. Moreover, Berlin is becoming a safe 
haven for activists or journalists around Snowden such 
as Sarah Harrison, Jacob Appelbaum or Laura Poitras 
who cooperate closely with the weekly newspaper Der 
Spiegel.
The debate surrounding a global system of surveil-
lance conducted by Western intelligence agencies is 
not	new.	About	fifteen	years	ago,	the	“Echelon”	disclo-
sures led the European Parliament to set up a board of 
inquiry.	In	its	final	report	in	2001,	the	board	described	
a global system for the interception and inspection of 
private and commercial communications transmitted 
via	 telephone	calls,	 fax,	e-mail,	and	other	data	 traffic	
by the so-called ‘Five Eyes Network’ – consisting of 
the intelligence agencies of Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, the UK, and the US.52 
Unfortunately, the report fell into oblivion immediately 
after 9/11. Beset by a securitization mania in the name 
of counter-terrorism, Western states passed one piece 
of surveillance legislation after another. Although the 
issue remained a topic seriously discussed at yearly 
German conferences such as the Chaos Communica-
tion Congress and on blogs like netzpolitik.org, critics 
found	it	difficult	to	voice	their	concerns	publicly	without	
being categorized as paranoid conspiracy theorists. 
Then, in summer 2013, Edward Snowden began to 
speak.
The German State Responds to the 
Snowden Leaks
In the weeks following Snowden’s disclosures of the 
international surveillance programs, it was revealed 
that the German foreign intelligence agency BND 
(‘Bundesnachrichtendienst’) had, within a month, 
transferred 500 million pieces of communications data 
to the NSA.53 This news sent shockwaves through the 
political	scene.	The	Federal	Government	first	reacted	
52 Report on the Existence of a Global System for the Intercep-
tion of Private and Commercial Communications (ECHELON 
Interception System) (European Parliament, July 2001), http://
cryptome.org/echelon-ep-fin.htm.	
53 Hubert Gude, Laura Poitras, and Marcel Rosenbach, “Mass 
Data: Transfers from Germany Aid US Surveillance,” Spie-
gel Online International, August, 5, 2013, http://www.spiegel.
de/international/world/german-intelligence-sends-massive-
amounts-of-data-to-the-nsa-a-914821.html. 
by attempting to downplay the importance of the issue. 
It stated that these data did not affect any German 
citizen, but that they were collected as part of intelli-
gence operations in states like Afghanistan. 
Ronald Pofalla, then Minister of the Chancellery 
and Angela Merkel’s coordinator for the oversight of 
German intelligence agencies, declared that any “mil-
lionfold violation of basic liberties in Germany” did not 
exist. He referred to written assurances from the US 
and the UK governments, according to which both 
states remained “within rights and law in Germany” and 
did not conduct any mass surveillance.54 Doubts arose 
quickly, especially concerning the choice of phrases 
such as “in Germany.” After all, the US operates the 
so-called “Dagger Complex,” a military base near 
Darmstadt, from which they can surveil outside of the 
gaze of German authorities.
The former Minister of the Interior, Hans-Peter 
Friedrich, travelled to the US and returned defending 
their surveillance programs. He stated publicly that the 
US would not spy on Germany due to its status as a 
“friendly nation,” and that all related processes would 
be in accordance with US law. The German govern-
ment thereby considered the affair to be over.
Shortly thereafter, it became known that German intel-
ligence agencies had made use of the NSA analysis 
software	“XKeyScore.”55 The agency’s defense, that it 
was only testing the software, was roughly as believ-
able as Bill Clinton’s claim that he “didn’t inhale” when 
asked if he had ever smoked marijuana.
As more information was revealed, the government’s 
original	narrative	crumbled	–	officials	gradually	arrived	
at the realization that their political resilience would 
depend on their ability to protect citizens’ privacy under 
the law. 
The Merkel administration presented the idea of a 
“No-Spy Agreement” which would be negotiated with 
the US government to ensure that nobody in Germany 
54 “NSA Spy Scandal: Merkel Aide Says ‘Data Protection Being 
Upheld,’” Spiegel Online International, July 25, 2013, http://
www.spiegel.de/international/world/ronald-pofalla-germany-did-
not-illegally-support-nsa-activity-a-913216.html. 
55	 “‘Prolific	Partner’:	German	Intelligence	Used	NSA	Spy	Pro-
gram,” Spiegel Online International, July 20, 2013, http://www.
spiegel.de/international/germany/german-intelligence-agencies-
used-nsa-spying-program-a-912173.html. 
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would be surveilled by the US or German governments 
from then on.56 The Minister of the Interior even went 
so far as to suggest that citizens should protect their 
privacy on their own. Unfortunately, neither any form 
of public education nor any sponsorship of necessary 
programs for digital self-defense were introduced.
To react to the problem at the international level, two 
initiatives were introduced in the arena. Initially, the 
German government sought to enshrine digital privacy 
in a human rights treaty by drafting an additional 
protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), a legally binding international 
treaty.57 The intention was to update its provision on 
the right to privacy (Article 17) for the digital age. It was 
supported by Germany, Austria, Hungary, Switzerland, 
and Liechtenstein, among other nations. The US did 
not support the initiative and likely would not have 
signed it.
Shortly thereafter, the Brazilian government proposed 
drafting a UN resolution calling for the right to privacy 
in the digital age, with the intention of ending excessive 
electronic surveillance and considering illegal collection 
of personal data to be a highly intrusive act. Though 
the US managed to weaken important components of 
the resolution before its adoption by the UN General 
Assembly in December 2013, the US ultimately signed 
the resolution. German media reacted positively: An 
optional protocol to the ICCPR would have questioned 
the general applicability of Article 17 on the right to 
privacy, but instead it automatically applies to privacy 
issues in the digital age. Although the resolution is 
unfortunately not legally binding, it is perceived as an 
important diplomatic shield against uncontrolled mass 
surveillance.  
The support of both initiatives by the German govern-
ment can be interpreted as an emergency political 
reaction: After all, the Federal Government was unable 
to react adequately to the heavy public criticism caused 
by Snowden’s revelations without taking the risk of 
56	 Severin	Weiland,	“Troubling	Questions:	No-Spy	Pact	Backfires	
on Berlin,” Spiefel Online International, August 13, 2013, http://
www.spiegel.de/international/germany/merkel-chief-of-staff-
pofalla-announces-german-us-no-spy-pact-a-916353.html. 
57 “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” United 
Nationa Human Rights, December 16, 1966, http://www.ohchr.
org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx. 
upsetting its “friend and partner,” the US. By pushing 
for a reaction at the international level, the government 
could demonstrate its capacity to act while simultane-
ously deferring a potential solution to the future. 
Post-Snowden Political Fallout
In the midst of the coalition negotiations, new infor-
mation surfaced: The United States had spied on 
Chancellor Angela Merkel, along with numerous other 
political elites, from its embassy in Berlin. The federal 
government reacted with surprise. According to media 
reports, Merkel had a private talk with Barack Obama 
in which she drew a comparison between the ongoing 
US surveillance programs and the former surveil-
lance apparatus operated by the so called “Stasi,” the 
internal state security and surveillance service of the 
GDR, where Merkel herself grew up.58
Yet the federal government was unable to explain to the 
public why surveillance of Merkel’s cell phone consti-
tuted a scandal while the comprehensive surveillance 
of	 the	 entire	 population	 was	 no	 problem.	 Officially,	
the government was still convinced that there was 
no evidence for mass surveillance apart from media 
reports.
It remains unclear precisely where the gap lies. Were the 
responsible parties in the government and intelligence 
agencies incredibly naive and – despite the “Echelon” 
scandal and the surrounding debates – unaware of the 
practices of intelligence agencies, or are German intel-
ligence agencies much more embedded in the NSA 
surveillance-network than previously expected? 
The role of our own German intelligence agencies 
remains unclear. The world’s largest internet exchange 
point,	the	DE-CIX,	is	located	in	Frankfurt,	in	the	middle	
of Germany. Under current law, the German foreign 
intelligence agency BND is allowed to automatically 
surveil	up	to	20	percent	of	communication	flows	through	
the	DE-CIX.	The	implementation	details	remain	secret	
and may not be publicized. A small “G10 Commis-
sion” supervises the activity without adequate control 
capacities, resources, or even technical expertise. 
58 Ian Traynor, and Paul Lewis, “Merkel compared NSA to Stasi in 
heated encounter with Obama,” The Gaurdian, December 17, 
2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-
compares-nsa-stasi-obama. 
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Disclosures suggest that the 20% of communications 
could have been reinterpreted by the agency so that 
it	surveils	significantly	more	internet	traffic	than	previ-
ously expected. 
There are also suspicions that the European intelli-
gence agencies surveil each others’ citizens under the 
mantle, “you surveil our citizens, we surveil yours, and 
afterwards we will legally trade this information with 
one another.” Proven instances of such an exchange 
between the NSA and the GCHQ supports presump-
tions that this occurs between other intelligence 
agencies as well.
In its coalition agreement, the new federal government 
dealt with the surveillance scandal by promising some 
form	of	clarification	and	an	advancement	of	 technical	
protection possibilities by creating and supporting a 
national IT security industry, as well as the re-introduc-
tion of data retention, which appeared in the coalition 
agreement document, a non-binding contract in which 
the political parties proposed an agenda for their future 
government. The six-month long retention of all com-
munication metadata had already been established 
in legislation passed between 2008 and 2010. But, 
after roughly 34,000 citizens brought a class-action 
lawsuit to the federal constitutional court (the largest 
class action in the court’s history), the court ruled the 
law unconstitutional.59 Unfortunately, the ruling only 
concerned this particular legislation, rather than the 
practice itself. It explicitly left open a means by which 
data retention could be re-introduced in accordance 
with constitutional law. 
“Schengennetz” and Other Solutions
While Snowden revealed that the NSA had essentially 
built up a global data retention system, the new federal 
government evidently believed that the proper response 
to the issue was to build a national data retention 
program. The answer to surveillance came in the form 
of additional means for conducting more surveillance 
by which all citizens would be placed under general 
suspicion without cause. Their communication data – 
the identity of communicating citizens, the place, the 
time, and the means of their communication – would be 
stored for, as of now, an unknown number of months.
59 “Constitutional Court Overturn Data Retention Directive,” Lin-
klaters, March 17, 2013, http://www.linklaters.com/Publications/
Publication1403Newsletter/20100317/Pages/Germany%E2%80
%93ConstitutionalCourt.aspx. 
At the same time, the former telecommunications 
monopoly Deutsche Telekom came up with the idea 
of a national, and then later European, solution of 
so-called “Schengenrouting.”60 Inspired by unrestricted 
European	 border	 traffic	 within	 a	 certain	 area	 with	
strong external borders, data packets on data links 
within the EU would not be routed through external 
countries, in an effort to prevent them from being inter-
cepted, stored, or analyzed. The federal government 
around Angela Merkel enthusiastically embraced the 
idea and is currently pushing for its implementation on 
the EU level together with France and others. The idea 
certainly	has	benefits;	however,	there	has	not	been	suf-
ficient	discussion	about	the	possible	collateral	damage	
that such a program could bring.
There is a risk that the “Schengennetz” may not lead 
to the objective of less surveillance but may rather 
shift corresponding powers to the various national 
intelligence agencies. By intercepting and analyzing 
data transmission in Europe exclusively on their own, 
chances are good that European intelligence services 
can strengthen their negotiation position vis-a-vis the 
NSA when it comes to data exchange. Another risk is the 
de-facto abolition of net neutrality. In the months prior 
to Snowden, Deutsche Telekom was heavily criticized 
after announcing its intention of ending network neu-
trality and introducing a regime of “managed services,” 
wherein partner corporations could privilege their own 
services. Critics claim that the idea of a Schengennetz 
would	lead	to	a	solidification	of	this	“managed	services”	
regime in Europe and become a means of solidifying 
the market position of the largest European service 
providers. Further criticism suggests that this routing 
could reawaken ideas such as block lists and other 
forms of censorship.
In the meantime, the new coalition has taken the reins 
of the federal government and is now arguing with the 
opposition in the Bundestag about the establishment of 
an NSA board of inquiry. The dispute concerns which 
area ought to be explored. While everyone agrees that 
the practices of the NSA and the company call for clari-
fication,	the	governing	coalition	is	blocking	any	attempt	
at scrutinizing the practices of the German intelligence 
60	 Jan-Peter	Kleinhans,	“Schengen-Routing,	DE-CIX	und	die	
Bedenken der Balkanisierung des Internets,” Netzpolitik.org, 
November 13, 2013, https://netzpolitik.org/2013/schengen-rout-
ing-de-cix-und-die-bedenken-der-balkanisierung-des-internets/. 
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agency. If we want to have an honest and progressive 
discussion that will move the country forward, we need 
to know: Who knew which details during the largest 
surveillance scandal in human history? And when 
exactly did they come to know them?
Challenges for Society
Civil society will not tire of debating these questions. 
Last fall, roughly 20,000 people gathered in Berlin for 
the “Freedom not Fear” demonstration.61 Not a month 
passes	without	a	petition	from	influential	groups	such	
as	 writers,	 lawyers,	 or	 NGOs	 demanding	 clarifica-
tion and political consequences and amassing large 
amounts of media attention.
Above all, the entire scandal is sorely missing any com-
mensurate political consequences. The most important 
witness in this surveillance scandal, Edward Snowden, 
remains trapped in Moscow. He would be the right 
person to help clarify some of this story’s many facets. 
Germany should provide him protection, a safe stay, 
and question him as a witness. 
While nobody outside of the federal government 
believes that a No-Spy agreement with the United 
States could actually exist, especially given that 
this idea has been vetoed numerous times by the 
Obama Administration, various EU-US data exchange 
programs should be up for debate. Foremost among 
these is the so-called “Safe Harbor” agreement that 
regulates data exchange between the EU and the 
US. “Safe Harbor” was negotiated under the premise 
that the same data protection standards concerning 
personal data of European citizens would be upheld 
in the US as in the EU.62 That this is not the case in 
reality ought to be clear through the practices of 
Google, Facebook, and others, whose subjection to 
secret FISA courts connects them directly to the sur-
veillance apparatus. There are other agreements too. 
Through the Passenger Name Record agreement, US 
authorities	can	access	flight	data.	The	same	holds	true	
in the “SWIFT” agreement that governs the transfer 
of	financial	data.	Since	all	of	 these	agreements	were	
clearly negotiated under false pretenses, and since it is 
61  “Thousands rally in Berlin to protest NSA Internet surveillance,” 
United Press International, September 10, 2013, http://www.upi.
com/Top_News/Special/2013/09/10/Thousands-rally-in-Berlin-
to-protest-NSA-Internet-surveillance/UPI-68021378785720/. 
62 “U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Agreement,” Export.gov, http://export.gov/
safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018476.asp. 
becoming increasingly clear that intelligence agencies 
are using this data for economic espionage and surveil-
lance of EU citizens, there is only one evident option: 
the immediate cancellation of these treaties and an end 
to all unwarranted surveillance.
We are facing a great challenge.
Do we want to accept that the entirety of our digital com-
munications are surveilled, analyzed, and retained? Do 
we still live in a democracy if we conform our life to 
this reality and moderate our own communication in 
anticipatory obedience and sometimes even abstain 
from speaking our opinions? Or do we already partially 
live in a surveillance society?
As democratic societies we need to remain active and 
display a long-standing commitment to these issues. 
We need to explain the problem, place new disclo-
sures into context, and continue to apply critical public 
pressure	so	that	we	can	finally	get	clarification	on	these	
questions: Who exactly is being surveilled? How can 
we	find	technical	and	political	solutions	that	will	allow	
us to regain our private sphere? Above all, we need 
to prevent these revelations from becoming a study in 
the feasibility of further surveillance measures. Edward 
Snowden sent us a warning. We should take it and 
thank him for the wakeup call.
Currently, German politics are trapped between a 
historic alliance with the United States and US allies 
on the one hand, and its own political experiences that 
gave rise to a fundamental appreciation of civil and 
political liberties on the other. German politicians must 
now admit to the supremacy of these freedoms. The 
international process surrounding NETmundial consti-
tutes an opportunity for Germany to act as a leader in 
the global establishment and enforcement of human 
rights in the digital age.   
Markus Beckedahl is the founder and head of the blog 
netzpolitik.org. He is the co-founder of the annual 
Re:Publica conference in Berlin and of Digitale Ge-
sellschaft (Digital Courage), a Berlin NGO concerned 
with the defense of digital rights. As an expert on civil 
liberties in the digital age, he has testified before par-
liamentary commissions on several occasions.
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Is it possible to develop a regulatory framework for 
the internet that promotes innovation, access to 
knowledge, and personal privacy? Can this be done 
while simultaneously upholding legitimate govern-
ments’ need to defend state and citizen security online? 
The upcoming NETmundial meeting in São Paulo, 
Brazil will bring together government representatives, 
technology companies, legal advocates, academics, 
and members of the technical community to discuss 
pressing questions about the future of global internet 
governance. Brazil is a uniquely appropriate location 
for such a meeting, as, for nearly six years, internet 
stakeholders have been debating these very questions 
under the mantle of the much-heralded Marco Civil da 
Internet (Civil Framework for the Internet). 
Concern surrounding internet regulation gained force in 
2008, when Congressman Eduardo Azeredo proposed 
new text for the Bill on Cybercrime (PL Azeredo63), a 
draft law that had been in legislative limbo since 1999. 
The bill aimed to establish new criminal offenses that 
could be, “[committed] by the use of an electronic, 
digital or similar system, networked computers, or 
that are applied against devices or communication 
systems and the like.” Debates surrounding the bill 
reflected	 a	 common	 idea	 that	 Brazil	 needed	 internet	
regulation and control, and that this bill could serve 
that purpose. Supporters also argued that the bill would 
render Brazil compliant with the Budapest Convention 
on Cybercrime, an agreement that sought to establish 
international norms on cybercrime. Although there 
is some doubt as to whether or not the law actually 
met the standards of the Convention, signing and 
complying with the Convention was seen by many 
as an important step in Brazil’s efforts to assert its 
leadership on technical policy issues both within Latin 
America and internationally.
63 “BRASIL. Projeto de Lei n.º 84, de 1999,” February 1999, http://
www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/fichadetramitacao?idPro-
posicao=15028
Nationally, debates around the bill triggered substan-
tial	 criticism	 and	 fueled	 a	 redefinition	 of	 a	 desired	
framework	for	internet	regulation.	One	of	the	first	critical	
papers was a 2007 article by Brazilian legal scholar 
Ronaldo Lemos,64 which proposed that, in the interest 
of promoting innovation in the country, prior to criminal-
izing online practices there should be a civil regulatory 
framework for the internet.
June 2008 saw a wave of protests against Azeredo’s 
proposal. Shortly before the bill was to be considered 
on	the	Senate	floor,	André	Lemos,	professor	of	Com-
munication at the Federal University of Bahia (UFBA); 
João Caribé, a digital activist; and Sergio Amadeu, 
a sociologist and advocate of free software in Brazil, 
wrote and distributed an online petition in an effort 
to “veto the Cybercrime Bill - in defense of freedom 
and the development of knowledge on the Brazilian 
internet.” The petition, which received over 160,000 
signatures,	emphasized	the	benefits	of	an	open	internet	
for economic and social development in Brazil. It also 
highlighted existing problems with the Azeredo Bill, 
urging legislators to vote against it. The petition read:
“On the internet, the freedom to create content 
feeds and is fed by the freedom to create new 
forms of media, new programs, new technolo-
gies, new social networks. Freedom is the basis 
of knowledge creation. And it is the basis for 
the development and survival of the internet. 
[...] [The text] proposed by Senator Eduardo 
Azeredo would block creative online activities 
and effectively attack the Internet…it could 
require all Internet service providers surveil their 
users, framing each user as probable criminal. 
It would mean suspicion, fear and the failure of 
net neutrality. If the bill is approved, thousands 
64 Ronaldo Lemos, “Internet brasileira precisa de marco regu-
latório civil [The Brazilian Internet needs a civil regulatory 
framework],” UOL Noticias, May 2007, http://tecnologia.uol.com.
br/ultnot/2007/05/22/ult4213u98.jhtm. 
Building the Marco Civil: A Brief Review of 
Brazil’s Internet Regulation History
By Juliana Nolasco Ferreira
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of internet users will be transformed…into 
[potential] criminals.”65
Grassroots networks compared the Draft Law on 
Cybercrime to “Institutional Act 5”66(Al-5), one of 
the toughest acts of Brazil’s military regime which 
enshrined state censorship and surveillance. From 
this moment forward, the debate gained a popular 
dimension, departing from the legal discourse of the 
legislative universe.
In August 2008, a public petition was referred to the 
Congress requesting a public hearing to discuss the 
social, economic, political, legal, technological, and 
scientific	impacts	of	the	Cybercrime	Bill.	Parallel	to	this,	
the former Minister of Justice Tarso Genro defended 
the Brazilian signing of the Budapest Convention. The 
following year, the Ministry of Justice began drafting a 
bill intended to replace the law proposed by Senator 
Azeredo. 
Public outcry around the Azeredo bill, and indeed any 
legislation geared towards reducing online crime, still 
persisted. In April 2009, organized civil society groups 
of Rio Grande do Sul – including the Labor Party, 
various labor unions, and the Free Software Associa-
tion – sent a letter to the Minister of Justice demanding 
the discontinuance of the Azeredo Bill. The letter stated 
that:
“A	 significant	 proportion	 of	 civil	 society	 orga-
nizations of Rio Grande do Sul are extremely 
concerned about the possible approval of the 
Cybercrimes Bill, proposed by Senator Eduardo 
Azeredo (PSDB-MG). Just when we debate and 
fight	for	a	radical	democracy	in	the	country,	and	
strive so that there is no electoral discontinuity of 
our democratic and popular government at the 
65 “Pelo veto ao projeto de cibercrimes - Em defesa da liberdade e 
do progresso do conhecimento na Internet Brasileira [Promot-
ing a veto of the cybercrime bill -- in defense of freedom and 
progress of knowledge on the Brazilian internet],” Comunidade 
de Cibercultura, 2008, http://www.petitiononline.com/veto2008/
petition.html.
66  The Ato Institucional Número 5 (Institutional Act Number 5) 
was	the	fifth	of	seventeen	major	decrees	issued	by	the	military	
dictatorship in Brazil. One of its consequences was the prelimi-
nary	censorship	of	music,	films,	theater	and	television	(a	work	
could be censored if it was understood as subverting political 
and moral values) and the censorship of the press and of other 
means of mass communication.
Federal level, the threat of a law that represents 
a ‘Digital AI-5’ emerges. The Azeredo Bill will 
criminalize common practices on the  internet; 
make our Digital Inclusion projects more 
expensive; prohibit open networks; worsen leg-
islation regarding intellectual property; legalize 
surveillance; disrupt collaborative content sites; 
frontally attack individual privacy and provide 
mechanisms for political persecution, as there 
was in the days of dictatorship. We will have 
a controlled internet, worse than in countries 
like Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and China. Thus, we 
claim: Archiving the ‘substitute’ text organized 
within the Ministry of Justice; Support for non-
approval of PL Azeredo, especially through the 
deletion of Articles 285-A, 285-B, 163-A and 22, 
and the constitution of a committee of members 
from the civil society to draft a proposal for a 
regulatory civil framework for the internet.”67
In response to the letter, Genro recognized the public 
debate, as well as the critiques and problems brought 
by the Cybercrime Bill. For him, the letter “[...] took the 
discussion of the bill to a new level, more technical 
and political and less passionate.68” The Minister also 
softened the text debated within the Ministry of Justice, 
assuring the agency’s commitment to correcting the 
problems created by the Cybercrime Bill and guaran-
teeing the participation of civil society in the process.
On June 4, 2009, Special Advisor to the President of the 
Republic Cezar Alvarez arranged a meeting between 
President Lula and representatives from various 
social movements and digital inclusion projects, with 
the intention of discussing cybercrime issues. This 
represented	 the	 first	 of	 various	 federal	 government	
efforts to facilitate and participate in internet regulation 
discussions, in order to build an alternative to the bill 
that	would	satisfy	the	increasingly	firm	demands	of	civil	
society.
67 “MINISTRO DA JUSTIÇA RESPONDE A REINVIDICACOES 
SOBRE PL AZEREDO [Ministry of Justice Responds to 
Concerns about PL Azeredo],” blog Direito a Comunicação, 
May 2009, http://www.direitoacomunicacao.org.br/content.
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4927
68 “MINISTERIO DA JUSTICA CRITICA LEI SOBRE CRIMES NA 
INTERNET E QUER VETO A ARTIGOS [Ministry of Justice 
Criticizes and Wants to Veto Some Articles of Law on Internet 
Crime],” Site Jus Brasil, June 2009, http://direito-do-estado.
jusbrasil.com.br/noticias/1060525/ministerio-da-justica-critica-
lei-sobre-crimes-na-internet-e-quer-veto-a-artigos.
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From Criminal law to a Civil 
Framework
In June of 2009, President Lula attended the 10th 
International Free Software Forum in Porto Alegre. Ac-
companied by Cezar Alvarez, then Secretary of State 
Dilma Rousseff, and Minister of Justice Tarso Genro, 
he was greeted by many free software activists, among 
them Marcelo Branco,69 a leading activist and organizer 
of the Forum. In his opening speech, Lula recognized 
the discontent of the social movement and acknowl-
edged the symbolic precedent that the Cybercrime Bill 
would promote online censorship. Lula stated:
“So I think that we are living in a revolution-
ary moment for humanity, in which the press 
no longer has the power that it had a few 
years ago, in which information is no longer a 
selective thing where the owners of information 
can stage a coup d’état, in which information 
is no longer a privileged thing. The evening 
newspaper is already old in the face of the 
internet, or of the radio broadcast; if it doesn’t 
come out live, if it comes out recorded, it’s 
already gotten out of date compared to the 
internet. The newspaper is coming to seem very 
old compared to the internet, and it’s getting so 
old that all the newspapers have created blogs 
to report on the whole world together with the 
internet users. Well, these things, these things 
-- none of us knows where they’re going to stop, 
we don’t know, do we? (…) This law here, this 
law here, it doesn’t aim to fix the abuse of the 
internet. It really tries to impose censorship. 
What we need, Tarso Genro, my friend, who 
knows, might be to change the Civil Code, who 
knows, it might be to change anything. What we 
need is to make the people who work with the 
digital issues, with the internet, responsible. We 
need to create responsibility but not to forbid or 
punish. It’s the police’s interest in making a law 
which lets people go into people’s homes to see 
what people are doing, even confiscating their 
computers. It’s not possible, it’s not possible.”70
69 Marcelo Branco was also Campus Party Brazil director for three 
years and the person responsible for President Dilma’s Digital 
Campaign in 2010.
70 “Full Speech of President Lula at Fisl10,” Software Livre Brasil 
blog,	June	2009,	http://softwarelivre.org/portal/fisl10/veja-escu-
te-e-leia-na-integra-o-discurso-do-presidente-lula-no-fisl-10.
Lula’s speech marked a critical turning point in the 
national debate about internet regulation. From this 
moment forward, it became clear that the President 
saw the connection between the Azeredo Bill and cen-
sorship and the related, requisite need of guaranteed 
rights on the network. 
After Lula’s speech, the Ministry of Justice, entrusted 
with the task of proposing a framework of civil rights for 
internet regulation in Brazil, approached and signed an 
agreement with the Centre for Technology and Society 
at the Getulio Vargas Foundation (CTS-FGV) to design 
and organize a debate around the issue. Lemos’ 2007 
article offered a preliminary conceptual framework for 
the type of law they hoped to develop.
Given the novelty of the theme, the Ministry and 
CTS-FGV opted for a public consultation that would 
take	shape	through	two	phases.	The	first	phase	was	an	
open, online call for comments that allowed participants 
to submit comments through an open blogging platform 
or via Twitter. In the second phase, the Ministry of 
Justice presented a draft law for comments. The con-
sultation was carried out via digital tools because the 
leaders of the process were committed to making the 
debate truly inclusive for all internet users in Brazilian 
society.
The execution of the public consultation depended on 
the participation of the Ministry of Culture. During this 
process, all formal public debates surrounding the con-
struction of the bill took place within the Brazilian Digital 
Culture Forum, the platform created by the Ministry of 
Culture to bring together people interested in debating 
the development of public policies and regulatory 
frameworks for the digital world.
Thus the Marco Civil da Internet began to develop, and 
a pivotal debate about what Brazilian society wanted 
for	 the	 internet	ensued.	 In	 the	first	stage	of	consulta-
tion, the Ministry of Justice proposed a base text 
divided into three strands representing the key stake-
holders: citizens (in response to the debate raised by 
PL Azeredo, focusing on freedom of expression, with-
drawal of content, access and privacy); companies (in 
response to discussions about intermediary liability in 
respect of third party content and net neutrality), and 
government. 
The debate on the Marco Civil attracted a community 
of experts and a broad swath of civil society, leading 
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to a total of 1,168 comments, countless contributions 
via Twitter, and numerous mentions in blogs and news. 
The public consultations allowed society to discuss 
the issue in a transparent way. The process fused 
different elements into a coherent response that could 
be	presented	as	a	unified	social	demand.	The	process	
continued until May 2010, when the Ministry of Justice 
developed	a	final	draft	of	the	bill.	 In	August	24,	2011,	
President	 Dilma	 Rousseff	 sent	 the	 final	 draft	 to	 the	
Brazilian Congress. 
New questions and controversy surrounding the 
internet debate surfaced in May 2012, when nude 
photos of famous Brazilian actress Carolina Dieckmann 
leaked on the net and were widely shared on blogs and 
news websites. A police investigation launched, and 
the story rapidly became a hot topic for public gossip. 
In November of that year, a computer crimes law that 
called	for	“…the	definition	of	computer	crimes	and	other	
matters” was approved and rapidly became known as 
Carolina Dieckmann Law.71 Articles were added to the 
Criminal	Code	which	defined	crimes	committed	in	the	
digital environment, and criminalized such behaviors 
with	penalties	of	one	 to	five	years’	 imprisonment	and	
a	fine.
Later that month, the Azeredo Bill was approved in a 
condensed version with many of its most controversial 
points	 removed,	 though	 it	 added	credit	 card	 falsifica-
tion and treason to the criminal code and proposed the 
creation	of	a	police	 infrastructure	 to	fight	cybercrime.	
There was some probability that, in the same week, the 
Marco Civil da Internet would come to a vote. However, 
due to lack of consensus and doubts around the bill, it 
was postponed.
Edward Snowden and the 
Resuscitation of the Marco Civil
In July 2013, on the heels of the initial Edward Snowden 
disclosures concerning surveillance programs run by 
the US National Security Agency, Glenn Greenwald 
published an article in the Brazilian newspaper O 
Globo	 confirming	 that	Brazil	was	also	a	 target	of	US	
surveillance. The Brazilian government did not hesitate 
71 Isabela Fraga, “Brazilian lower house approves two cyber crime 
bills but postpones vote on Internet Bill of Rights,” Knight Center 
for Journalism in the Americas, November 8, 2012, https://
knightcenter.utexas.edu/blog/00-12025-brazilian-lower-house-
approves-two-cyber-crime-bills-postpones-vote-internet-bill-righ.
to react – diplomatic representatives in both the US 
and	 Brazil	 demanded	 an	 explanation.	 In	 an	 official	
statement, Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota wrote:
“The Brazilian Government has received with 
serious concern the news that the electronic 
and telephone communications of Brazilian 
citizens would be the subject of espionage 
agencies of U.S. intelligence. [...] The Brazilian 
Government has requested clarification from 
the U.S. government through the Embassy 
of Brazil in Washington as well as the United 
States Ambassador in Brazil. [...] The Brazilian 
government will promote, within the Internation-
al Telecommunication Union (ITU) in Geneva, 
the development of multilateral rules on tele-
communications security. In addition, Brazil will 
launch in the UN initiatives designed to prohibit 
abuses and to protect the privacy of users of 
virtual communication networks, establishing 
clear rules of conduct of States in the field of 
information and telecommunications to ensure 
cyber security that protects citizens’ rights and 
preserve the sovereignty of all countries.”72
On September 24, during the 68th General Assembly 
of the United Nations in New York, President Dilma 
Rousseff criticized the actions of espionage in Brazil and 
indicated that the country would present a multilateral 
regulatory framework for the internet, encompassing 
principles such as:
 
 “1 - Freedom of expression, privacy of the individual  
and respect for human rights.
 2 - Open, multilateral and democratic governance, 
carried out with transparency by stimulating col-
lective creativity and the participation of society, 
Governments and the private sector.
 3 - Universality that ensures the social and human 
development and the construction of inclusive and 
non-discriminatory societies
 4 - Cultural diversity, without the imposition of beliefs, 
customs and values.
 5 - Neutrality of the network, guided only by technical 
and ethical criteria, rendering it inadmissible to 
72 “AS DENÚNCIAS DE ESPIONAGEM E A ATUAÇÃO DO ITA-
MARATY [Reports on Espionage and Practices of Itamaraty],” 
Diplomacia Pública blog, July 2013, http://diplomaciapublica.
itamaraty.gov.br/13-brasil-estados-unidos/29-as-denuncias-de-
-espionagem-e-a-atuacao-do-itamaraty.
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restrict it for political, commercial, religious or any 
other purposes.
Harnessing the full potential of the internet requires, 
therefore, responsible regulation, which ensures at 
the same time freedom of expression, security and 
respect for human rights73”.
As a result of Snowden revelations, the issue of internet 
regulation again became a priority for the Brazilian 
government. The government realized that the Marco 
Civil could be an eloquent response to the surveillance 
issue and position Brazil as a global leader in internet 
governance and regulatory debates. On September 11, 
2013, President Dilma Rousseff appointed a regime of 
constitutional urgency to the bill, preventing Congress 
from voting on any other issues until the Marco Civil 
vote was completed. While this did not happen during 
the fall, in December 2013 the Marco Civil da Internet 
locked the agenda of the National Congress – no other 
vote could take place until the Chamber of Deputies 
(the lower house of Congress) voted on the bill. On 
March 25, 2014, the bill was approved by the Chamber 
of Deputies, and currently, at the time of this essay, the 
bill is awaiting review by the Senate.
Final Considerations
Over the last six years, Brazilian civil society has 
developed an acute and globally unique conscious-
ness about the need for a legal framework for the 
internet that matches the social, economic, and cultural 
reality of the country. The public and many government 
officials	recognize	that	promoting access to knowledge 
and culture will be crucial to the development of the 
nation.
The subject of internet regulation remains controversial 
worldwide. Issues surrounding freedom of speech, in-
novation, and illicit acts online continue to challenge 
existing legal frameworks, which are increasingly insuf-
ficient	in	providing	answers	to	phenomena	in	the	virtual	
world. The Brazilian experience in the face of this 
challenge saw the debate transform from a proposed 
cybercrime law, which could criminalize many ordinary 
online activities, to a civil framework of internet rights. 
During this process, organized civil society played an 
important role in shaping the debate around desirable 
73 “Statement by H. E. Dilma Rousseff, UN 68th General Assem-
bly,” GA Debate, United Nations, September 24, 2013,  http://
gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/BR_en.pdf.
forms of regulation, and mobilizing a dialogue with 
the government. This resulted in changes in the way 
internet regulation was seen and prioritized, and facili-
tated the proposal of regulation alternatives.
It is important to note that the issue of internet regu-
lation gained prominence in Brazil when the internet 
became widely used in the country and part of daily 
life. In a way, opposition to the Cybercrime Bill was 
highlighted because society perceived that it would 
affect their lives. Widespread public use of the internet 
as an economic, educational, and cultural tool was a 
breakpoint in this regard.
Similarly, the accumulation of knowledge around the 
subject inside the government resulted in new alter-
natives to internet regulation. Over the ten years of 
debates surrounding internet regulation in Brazil, the 
country	has	seen	a	dramatic	 intensification	of	 the	 in-
ternet’s use.
Finally, the Marco Civil da Internet was conceived 
through extensive debates and public consultations. 
If approved, the bill will be innovative, built through a 
radical democratic process with broad popular par-
ticipation, and cover issues concerning technological 
innovation, digital opportunities, and the creation of a 
more democratic information society.
Juliana Ferreira Nolasco is a graduate student 
in Public Administration and Government at the 
Getulio Vargas Foundation and researcher at Group 
Research and Education in Innovation (Gepi) of Law 
FGV (FGV-SP). She worked as the General Coordinator 
of the Cultural Economy and Cultural Studies of the 
Ministry of Culture.
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Summary
A quantitative analysis of the positions expressed with 
respect to certain issues in the contributions submitted 
to the The Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the 
Future of Internet Governance (NETMundial) reveals 
the following:
• There is broad support for: improving security; 
ensuring respect for privacy; ensuring freedom of 
expression; and globalizing the IANA function.
• There is no consensus on the proper role of gov-
ernments, that is, whether the roles as outlined 
in the Tunis Agenda are appropriate, or whether 
governments should have equal status with other 
stakeholders.
•	 There	 is	significant	support	 for	 increasing	 the	par-
ticipation of developing countries in discussions of 
internet governance.
• There is some support for: ensuring universal 
access; strengthening the Internet Governance 
Forum; interventions to foster infrastructure de-
velopment and deployment; and interventions to 
ensure network neutrality.
A leaked version of an early draft of a proposed output 
document	appears	to	fairly	reflect	the	input	documents,	
but some participants might be uncomfortable with 
some	portions	of	 that	draft.	 	The	final	output	might	of	
course	differ	significantly	from	the	leaked	draft.
1. The NETmundial Meeting
According to its website, NETmundial will focus on 
crafting internet governance principles and proposing 
a roadmap for the further evolution of the internet gov-
ernance ecosystem.
A total of 187 contributions were submitted to the 
meeting.  Most of them agreed that certain key prin-
ciples should apply to the internet and its governance. 
That consensus can be summarized as follows:
•	 Offline	rights	apply	equally	online.
• The internet should remain a single, universal, inter-
connected, interoperable, secure, stable, resilient, 
sustainable, free, and trusted network.
• Internet governance should involve all stakeholders 
from all parts of the world and be open, transparent, 
accountable, and bottom up.
• Policies should create a stable and predictable 
environment that fosters investment and favors in-
novation.
These, however, are general, high-level principles, 
whose implementation is open to interpretation.
For example, while there is consensus that free speech 
must	be	protected	online	as	well	as	offline,	there	is	no	
consensus regarding whether restrictions that exist in 
some particular countries violate existing human rights 
laws.74  
Similarly, there is no agreement on how best to foster 
investment in broadband infrastructure, in particular, 
whether net neutrality regulations should be imposed.
In order to gather more information from the rich set 
of data provided by the 187 contributions, we have 
analyzed them to determine what position each takes 
with respect to certain key issues that have been 
discussed for the past ten years.75 
74 For a more detailed discussion, see section 2 of Richard Hill, 
“The Internet, its governance, and the multistakeholder  model.”  
Info, 16 (2014): 16-46,  http://goo.gl/ejIk4Y.   An early version 
is available online as “Internet as a paradigm” at http://goo.gl/
qA4Zzi. 
75 For a summary of this issue, see Richard hill, “UN Internet 
Governance Discussion: Why Did It Fail To Agree And Why Will 
An Analysis of the NETmundial Inputs and 
Draft Output
By Richard Hill1*
1 *	President,	Association	for	Proper	Internet	Governance	<www.apig.ch>.		The	first	four	sections	of	this	paper	have	been	previously	published	
by Intellectual Property Watch <http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/03/20/quantitative-analysis-of-contributions-to-netmundial-meeting/>.
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These key issues are:
• asymmetric role of the US government with respect 
to the management of internet domain names and 
addresses, 
•	 financial	issues	related	to	the	increasing	use	of	the	
internet, and
• issues related to the relative lack of security of the 
internet, including lack of privacy.
Another issue has recently emerged: whether the roles 
and responsibilities outlined in the Tunis Agenda for the 
different stakeholders are still valid (in particular that 
policy authority for internet-related public policy issues 
is the sovereign right of States) or whether all stake-
holders should have equal status (also referred to as 
equal footing). 
The following issues were also mentioned in several 
contributions:
• freedom of expression,
• demilitarization of the internet (cyberpeace),
• whether new international agreements or organiza-
tions are needed,
• net neutrality and government intervention with 
respect to infrastructure,
• universal access,
• increased participation by developing countries in 
internet governance discussions, and
• strengthening the IGF.
Each of the contributions was coded according to its 
source (e.g. government, private sector, civil society, 
academia) and geographic origin (e.g. developed 
countries, developing countries).  Then each contribu-
tion was examined to determine whether it expressed 
a clear position with respect to the issues outlined 
above.  Then, we counted the number of contributions 
that expressed a clear position with respect to each 
of these issues.  The full set of data can be found at 
http://www.apig.ch/Quant%20Netmundial.xls.  It is 
important to note that in some cases, it was not clear 
whether the contribution was really expressing a clear 
position.  Further, some coding errors may have been 
made, thus the data should be treated as indicative, 
Discussions Continue?” Intellectual Property Watch, March 3, 
2014, http://goo.gl/hQclfq. For more details, see section 5.1.2 
of Richard Hill, “The Future of Internet Governance: Dystopia, 
Utopia, or Realpolitik,” February 2013, http://goo.gl/6Ja66f. 
not	definitive.		But,	as	we	will	see	below,	a	few	coding	
errors are not likely to have affected the overall results 
of the analysis.
It must be stressed that this is a partial analysis of the 
contributions, in the sense that many did not address 
any	of	the	specific	issues	outlined	above.		Those	contri-
butions are of course valuable and this analysis should 
not be taken to imply otherwise.
2. Results of the Analysis
The issues that were most frequently mentioned in the 
contributions were, in order:
• security (86)76
• privacy (74)
• freedom of expression (73)
• globalization of IANA (55)
• role of governments (52) – though there was no 
consensus on what that role should be
• better developing country participation (42)
• universal access (35)
• strengthening IGF (29)
• infrastructure intervention (29)
• net neutrality (26)
There were relatively few mentions of the other issues 
outlined above, namely:
• new international agreements (16)
• new organizations (10)
•	 financial	issues	(13)
• tax issues (6)
• cyberpeace (7)
While not tabulated in this workbook, the following are 
worth noting:
• Several contributions called on states to limit the 
liability of intermediaries. Such measures would be 
significant	 restrictions	 of	 national	 sovereignty,	 and	
such restrictions are usually negotiated internation-
ally, for example as treaties.  The contributions in 
question, however, did not call for negotiation of 
new treaties.
• A few contributions from the private sector called 
on states not to impose local data storage require-
76 The number after the issue indicates the number of contribu-
tions that mentioned the issue.
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ments,	that	is,	to	allow	the	free	flow	of	data	across	
borders. 
• Two contributions called for the creation of competi-
tive roots for the domain name system, to be used 
in parallel with the current root managed by ICANN. 
One contribution called for continuing with a single 
root.
3. Role of Governments
Regarding the role of governments, 32 contributions 
favored the role outlined in the Tunis Agenda, while 
30 took the view that governments should have equal 
status (or equal footing) with other stakeholders. Thus 
there is no consensus on this issue.
It is instructive to see which sources, or stakehold-
ers, favored which position.  In essence, the roles as 
outlined in the Tunis Agenda were favored by govern-
ments, while the private sector favored equal status. 
Civil society was divided on this issue, with US organi-
zations favoring equal status, while developing country 
organizations favored the Tunis Agenda; developed 
country organizations expressed split views.
The divergence of views on this issue between govern-
ments and the private sector would appear logical, for 
the reasons outlined in 5.1.2 of “The Future of Internet 
Governance: Dystopia, Utopia, or Realpolitik?.”
4. Other Comments
The following are other note-worthy takeaways from 
our analysis.
Universal access, infrastructure and net 
neutrality
The universal access issue was mentioned mostly in 
contributions from civil society, with some support from 
developing country governments.  The same holds for 
infrastructure intervention and network neutrality.
Financial issues
Thirty-five	 (35)	 contributions	 mentioned	 universal	
access,	 but	 only	 13	 mentioned	 financial	 issues.	 Yet	
it is widely understood that the relatively high cost of 
accessing the internet in developing countries is an im-
pediment to universal access (see for example section 
2.1.2 of “The Future of Internet Governance: Dystopia, 
Utopia,	 or	 Realpolitik?”).	 The	 financial	 issues	 were	
mentioned primarily in contributions from civil society.
Taxation
Fifteen (15) developed country governments submitted 
a contribution, but only one mentioned the taxation 
issue. Yet the St. Petersburg G20 declaration states 
that	there	is	a	need	to	identify	the	main	difficulties	that	
the digital economy poses for the application of existing 
international tax rules and to develop detailed options 
to	address	these	difficulties.77 The taxation issue was 
mentioned almost exclusively in contributions from civil 
society.
Other issues
The cyberpeace issue was mentioned primarily in contri-
butions from civil society.  The need for new international 
agreements was mentioned in some contributions from 
governments, civil society, and academia. The need 
for new organizations was mentioned primarily in some 
contributions from civil society, with some support from 
the technical community.
5. Output Document
On April 8, 2014, a draft version of the proposed 
output document of the meeting was leaked.78  Careful 
reading	of	that	draft	indicates	that	it	does	largely	reflect	
the input papers, even if some particular points could 
perhaps be added.  In particular, I am of the view that 
the following should be added:
• Add one new item to the Human Rights catalog 
under II on page 3: 
 “Democracy: everyone shall have the right and op-
portunity to take part in the conduct of public affairs 
and public policy decisions, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives.”
• At the end of the second paragraph of 4 of III, on 
page 9, add: 
77 See G20 Leaders, “Tax Annex to the St. Petersburg Declara-
tion,” G20, 6 September 2013, Annex, Action 1, http://goo.gl/
Q9m7ZH. 
78  Executive Stakeholder Committee, “NETmundial Executive 
Stakeholder committee (EMC) Outcome Document.” Wikileaks, 
April 8, 2014, http://www.wikileaks.org/netmundial-outcome/.  
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 “The operational aspects must not be subject to the 
law	of	any	one	country,	that	is,	they	must	benefit	
from immunity of jurisdiction.”
Another analysis of the draft output, produced by 
Knowledge Commons Brasil, also agrees that the 
leaked	document	generally	reflects	the	input	from	the	
187 submissions.79 
It	 must	 be	 noted	 that	 some	 specific	 portions	 of	 the	
draft output document may raise some questions. 
For example, such portions include:  the document’s 
language on limiting military use of the internet; the 
rather strong language on limiting surveillance; the 
specific	deadline	imposed	for	the	United	States	to	re-
linquish its supervision of certain aspects of the internet 
domain name and addressing system; the absence for 
any call for new bodies or new mechanisms; and the 
rather strong endorsement of the Internet Governance 
Forum.
Thus it would not be surprising if the document was 
revised	 and	 if	 the	 final	 output	 document	 was	 signifi-
cantly different from the leaked draft.
Since the NETmundial meeting is an informal meeting 
in which all stakeholders participate on an equal footing, 
it is my view that it should not make any decisions. 
Importance	 should	 therefore	 be	 placed	 on	 the	 final	
output document, which could provide valuable input 
to various decision-making entities, including technical 
standardization bodies and policy-making bodies such 
as national parliaments and intergovernmental organi-
zations.
79  Knowledge Commons Brasil, “Statement on NETmundial 
Outcome Document (Leaked by Wikileaks on 8 April 2014),” 
April 2014,  http://www.knowledgecommons.in/brasil/en/
internet-governance-meeting-in-brasil-23-24/statement-on-draft-
netmundial-document-leaked-by-wikileaks-on-8-april-2014/. 
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Every essay in this collection assumes basic goals of 
upholding human rights and protecting openness on the 
global	internet.	In	internet	governance	flow	charts,	we	
often see institutions such as ICANN and IETF at the 
top of the chain, typically followed by intergovernmental 
governance groups such as WIPO, a layer of national 
governments,	companies,	and	then	finally,	members	of	
the internet-using public, bearing the unapologetically 
wonky “end user” moniker. While institutions such as 
ICANN and the IETF have a tremendous impact on the 
core functionalities of the global internet, and hence the 
experience of all actors in this ecosystem, it is typically 
at the level of national legislation and corporate practice 
where we can most easily see policy determining the 
experiences of users. 
One could argue that until recently, the global public 
had a somewhat balkanized understanding of what 
influence	national	 governments	have	on	 the	 internet.	
Users in countries where censorship is pervasive and 
highly noticeable were aware of the boundaries set by 
national law within the online realm. Average users in 
other parts of the world were less cognizant. If there is 
one thing we can universally agree on about Edward 
Snowden, it is that the documents he leaked to the 
world brought most internet users into a state of active 
recognition about government power over the internet 
and	role	of	companies	within	this	field.	This	is	a	good	
thing. It is easy to lose sight of the general public’s 
understanding and wants when one is immersed in 
the internet and human rights world—this has been an 
exciting year in that regard.
As the essays in this collection demonstrate, the Marco 
Civil process in Brazil and the broad range of responses 
to surveillance revelations in Germany suggest that 
under the right conditions, a concerned public can 
play a powerful role in exposing and demanding the 
need for governments to uphold their commitments to 
human rights.
But	it	is	still	difficult	to	understand	precisely	where	the	
NETmundial	meeting	fits	 in	 the	broader	storyline.	We	
know that documents leaked by Edward Snowden 
set off a chain of events (revelations of corporate and 
political spying in Brazil and Dilma Rousseff’s subse-
quent lambasting of Barack Obama at the UN General 
Assembly80)  that led to NETmundial. Curiously 
however, the two stated objectives of NETmundial, 
developing principles for international internet gov-
ernance and a “roadmap” for the global governance 
ecosystem, do not sound like a means to a more 
privacy-protective global internet environment. There 
is glaring disconnect between the policy problem that 
triggered the response and the response itself. 
It comes as no surprise that global internet governance 
debates tend to be somewhat removed from national-
level	 context--if	 stakeholders	 truly	 sought	 to	 find	
practicable consensus on the myriad policy issues they 
face,	 the	 fights	would	 be	 bitter	 and	 the	 results	 likely	
unfavorable for most parties involved. But it is also 
difficult	 to	wrestle	with	 this	 reality	 in	a	world	 in	which	
national level policy and the actions of national govern-
ments indisputably present the foremost challenge to 
promoting and protecting human rights in the digital 
era. Despite their participation in global governance 
forums and their pledges to uphold human rights within 
the	UN	system,	governments	across	all	five	continents	
maintain powerful regimes of censorship, surveillance, 
and persecution of political critics.
In his essay for this collection, Markus Kummer 
highlights	 the	significance	of	 the	Tunis	Agenda	within	
global internet governance discussions and debates 
that have taken place since its drafting.81 Developed at 
the original World Summit on the Information Society 
(WSIS), it is the key document of reference for the 
Internet Governance Forum (an annual meeting born 
80 Julian Borger, “Brazilian president: US surveillance a ‘breach of  
international law’,” The Guardian, September 24, 2013, http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/24/brazil-president-un-
speech-nsa-surveillance.
81 “Tunis Agenda for the Information Society,” World Summit on 
Information Society, International Telecommunication Union, No-
vember 18, 2005, https://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.
html.
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out of the WSIS) and provides critical protection for 
multistakeholderism and human rights interests in other 
UN forums such as the ITU and the UN Committee on 
Technology, Science and Development. It articulates 
strong principles and human rights norms to be applied 
to policymaking for the internet and establishes clear if 
general parameters for these policymaking processes. 
Most notably, it presents the concept of multistake-
holder participation in internet governance not only 
as a favorable approach, but as one that would be 
necessary to uphold and preserve the unique, decen-
tralized nature of the global internet.
It is bizarre, though rarely noted, that the Tunis agenda 
was developed in 2005, during the regime of Zine El 
Abidine Ben Ali.82 Some of the most damaging evidence 
of human rights violations committed by the Ben Ali 
government comes from the period during which the 
WSIS meetings took place. For many digital and human 
rights	activists,	it	is	difficult	to	accept	the	legitimacy	of	
the Tunis Agenda when censorship, surveillance, and 
persecution of government critics were hallmarks of the 
Tunisian government at that time, not to mention many 
other governments involved in its drafting.
Objectively speaking, the Tunis Agenda envisions a 
policy environment for the internet that most human 
rights advocates would agree is much stronger than the 
current status quo of global internet freedom. At the end 
of the day, if national governments can surveil, censor, 
or even imprison their critics with little consequence, 
what good are documents such as the Tunis Agenda or 
the countless outcomes drafted for UN meetings, often 
drafted before the meetings even take place?
NETmundial promises to carry many of the hallmarks 
of the global internet governance landscape described 
here. But it is somewhat comforting that the particular 
context and circumstances, both global and national, 
are unique. Despite powerful corporate and govern-
ment interests that could tip the scales, when it comes 
to the internet there are proven, politically powerful 
forces of progressive policy thinking in Brazil. 
This was most clearly demonstrated last month in 
March, when Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies voted on 
and approved the country’s landmark Marco Civil bill. 
82 Sami Ben Gharbia, “Chelsea Manning and the Arab 
Spring,” Medium, Fall 2013, https://medium.com/republic-of-
tunisia/1907fec77df1.
In stark contrast to Tunis, Baku, or Dubai, the NETmun-
dial will be held in a country where there is a robust 
debate underway about human rights and the inter-
net—a  debate in which the public is not only deeply 
invested	but	has	also	become	heavily	influential.	
Essays in this collection by Juliana Nolasco, Ronaldo 
Lemos, and Markus Beckedahl, all expound upon 
specific	historical	roots	of	public	outrage	over	surveil-
lance and censorship, helping us to understand the 
particular meaning of internet regulation to publics in 
post-dictatorial states. The recent memory of authori-
tarianism in Brazil and Germany has driven powerful 
currents of public distrust in government, alongside 
public support for strong, rights-protective policies per-
taining to digital communications.
It is reasonable to argue that Dilma Rousseff’s support 
for the Marco Civil and insistence on carrying the global 
internet governance debate forward was triggered not 
simply by the Snowden revelations, but by the political 
weight and public fury that this news carried. Rousseff 
was able to consolidate support for the Marco Civil 
within the government because of the unique political 
circumstances of the moment— the NSA surveillance 
programs revealed by Edward Snowden demanded a 
powerful response that legislators had to get behind. 
That Rousseff was able to make this about national 
sovereignty and the protection of civil liberties in Brazil, 
is a remarkable political achievement, if it holds. How 
this will play out in determining the actual rights and 
protections enjoyed by Brazilian internet users remains 
to be seen.
It is similarly unclear precisely how Marco Civil will 
figure	 into	 the	 NETmundial,	 or	 how	 its	 presumed	
passage will or will not affect other participating govern-
ments.	It	is,	however,	encouraging	to	see	a	high-profile	
global governance meeting happening in a country 
where a legitimate debate is taking place, and where 
civil society and the general public have had a real and 
impactful voice. Context for these events matters very 
much.
There is reason to believe that this meeting will 
open a new chapter for the global internet gover-
nance debate—that the unique, combined effects 
of the Snowden revelations and the opportunism of 
the Brazilian government and ICANN will set a new 
tone for the these discussions as they move forward 
in the coming years. What is less certain is whether 
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these governance mechanisms will one day serve to 
hold governments accountable for their actions at the 
national level. What is clear is that the public and civil 
society experts must continue to press for account-
ability using all the tools we know— legal advocacy, 
technical research and investigation, and the simple 
undeniably powerful act of raising our voices.
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